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Abstract
Possibility measures and conditional possibility measures are given a behavioural
interpretation as marginal betting rates against events. Under this interpretation, pos-
sibility measures should satisfy two consistency criteria, known as ‘avoiding sure loss’
and ‘coherence’. We survey the rules that have been proposed for defining conditional
possibilities and investigate which of them satisfy our consistency criteria in two situ-
ations of practical interest. Only two of these rules satisfy the criteria in both cases
studied, and the conditional possibilities produced by these rules are highly uninfor-
mative. We introduce a new rule that is more informative and is also coherent in both
cases. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
When the term ‘possibility measure’ was coined by Zadeh [29] for what is
essentially a supremum preserving set function, the significance of this type of
set function had already been recognised in a number of other contexts [21–23].
These set functions are especially simple to work with because they can be
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completely characterised by point functions. In this respect, they are similar to
probability measures.
Consider a possibility space X, which is a non-empty set of possible states of
the world. In this paper we assume that X is finite. A possibility measure P on X
is a function, defined on the power set of X and taking values in the real unit
interval [0,1], such that P A [ B  maxf PA; P Bg, for all A  X and B  X.
Define the function p: X! 0; 1, such that px  P fxg, x 2 X. The point
function p then completely determines the set function P , since for any A  X,
P A  maxfpx: x 2 Ag. It is called the possibility distribution of P , and it
plays a similar role to a probability mass or density function.
Possibility measures have received much attention in fuzzy set theory
[4–6,12,13,29], mainly because of Zadeh’s possibility assignment equation [29], a
link which is claimed to exist between fuzzy sets and possibility distributions.
Using this link, possibility measures are taken to model the uncertainty con-
veyed by vague and non-specific statements. For recent evaluations of this
connection, we refer to [3,25,27].
But the relevance of possibility measures is certainly not restricted to fuzzy
set theory alone. They constitute an important special class of upper proba-
bilities in the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities [24], as we argued
in [8,25,26]. Provided a possibility measure P is normal, i.e. PX 
maxfpx: x 2 Xg  1, its values P A can be given a behavioural interpr-
etation as marginal rates for betting against the events A, where A  X; see
Section 2 for more details.
Conditioning is an important aspect of any uncertainty model. In the case of
possibility measures, various rules have been proposed for defining conditional
possibility measures or distributions from unconditional ones. The existence of
so many dierent proposals for defining conditional possibilities, and the ab-
sence of a convincing justification for any of the rules or even a criterion for
choosing between them, is disturbing. To evaluate the rules, we need (a) a
specific interpretation of degrees of possibility, and (b) some consistency cri-
teria to relate conditional and unconditional possibilities. In this paper we
adopt the behavioural interpretation of possibility measures. This interpr-
etation has the advantage that it leads directly to consistency criteria of
avoiding sure loss and coherence, and hence it provides a way of discriminating
between the proposed conditioning rules according to whether they satisfy the
criteria. 1 We also propose a new conditioning rule which appears to be su-
perior to the others in several ways.
1 The method used in this paper could be applied more generally to evaluate other kinds of rules
for combining or modifying possibility distributions, by investigating whether the possibility
distributions produced by the rules are coherent with the initial distributions. See pp. 45–46 of
Ref. [25] for more details.
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We shall be concerned with conditioning on variables rather than events, but
the ideas of the paper apply equally well to the latter type of conditioning. To
fix the notation, consider two variables X and Y . Let X and Y denote their
respective sets of possible values. We assume that X and Y are both finite: the
coherence conditions are more complicated, and more controversial, for infi-
nite spaces. Write p;  for the unconditional possibility distribution, px and
py for the marginal possibilities, 2 and pjx and pjy for the conditional
possibility distributions. Let
P A  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 Ag for non-empty A  XY;
P Bjy  maxfpxjy: x 2 Bg for non-empty B  X; y 2 Y;
P Cjx  maxfpyjx: y 2 Cg for non-empty C  Y; x 2 X
with P ;  P ;jy  P ;jx  0, denote the upper probability measures or
possibility measures generated by the possibility distributions p; , pjy and
pjx. The marginal distributions are given by
P X fyg  maxfpu; y: u 2 Xg  py;
P fxg Y  maxfpx; v: v 2 Yg  px:
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain and discuss the
behavioural interpretation of both unconditional and conditional possibility
measures. In Sections 3 and 4, we define the consistency criteria of normality,
avoiding sure loss and coherence, and we argue that it is indeed reasonable to
impose them if we want our possibilistic models to reflect rational behaviour.
We find that normality and avoiding sure loss are very easily satisfied in the
context of possibility measures. The criterion of coherence is given more at-
tention in Sections 5 and 6, where it is also used to discriminate between the
various conditioning rules extant in the literature.
The definitions of these rules are listed below, together with a short dis-
cussion of their backgrounds. A more detailed overview and discussion can be
found in Ref. [5]. It will be assumed here that the joint distribution p;  is
normal, i.e. that maxfpx; y: x; y 2 XYg  1.
1.1. Zadeh’s rule
Zadeh was the first to consider conditioning for possibility measures [29].
His rule is very simple, and consists in equating conditional degrees of possi-
bility with unconditional ones:
2 We do not distinguish in notation between the marginal possibility distributions for X and Y . It
will at all times be clear from the context which marginal is intended.
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pZAxjy  px; y; x 2 X; y 2 Y:
It has the disadvantage that it may produce unnormalised conditional possi-
bility distributions pZAjy, even when the joint distribution is normal. Indeed,
for any y 2 Y, pZAjy is unnormalised whenever the marginal py < 1!
1.2. Hisdal’s equation
Inspired by Bayes’ rule, which can be written as P x; y  P xjyPy, Hisdal
[16] proposed to define conditional possibilities using the following equation
relating the conditional, marginal and joint distributions:
px; y  minfpxjy; pyg; x 2 X; y 2 Y: 1
Whereas Bayes’ rule leads to a unique value P x; y=P y for the conditional
probability P xjy whenever P y > 0, Hisdal’s equation is much less restric-
tive. It has a unique solution pjy only if py  1. All its solutions are given
by:
pxjy 2 fpx; yg if px; y < py;px; y; 1 if px; y  py:

2
An arbitrary solution pjy of (1) need not be normal, as is exemplified by the
fact that Zadeh’s rule picks out the smallest solution. There are a number of
other conditioning rules which yield particular normal solutions of Hisdal’s
equation. We will consider the rules proposed by Ramer and by Dubois and
Prade.
1.3. Ramer’s rule
For a given y in Y, Hisdal’s equation may have more than one solution
pxjy only for those x 2 X which maximise p; y, i.e. which satisfy
px; y  py. Ramer’s rule [18] consists in picking one xo such that
pxo; y  py, letting pxojy  1, and pxjy  px; y for all other x in X. It
produces normal pjy, but it has the disadvantage of requiring an arbitrary
choice whenever there is more than one x that maximises p; y.
1.4. The Dubois–Prade rule
The conditioning rule proposed by Dubois and Prade [10,12–14] is a vari-
ation on this theme, but it does not suer from the ambiguity in Ramer’s rule,
because it takes pxjy  1 for every x which maximises p; y. It is defined as
follows, for x 2 X, y 2 Y:
pDPxjy  px; y if px; y < py;1 if px; y  py:

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For every y 2 Y, this rule yields the greatest, or as Dubois and Prade call it, the
least specific, solution pDPjy of Hisdal’s equation, and pjy is always nor-
mal.
1.5. Dempster’s rule
In an important paper about upper and lower probabilities induced by
multi-valued mappings [9], Dempster proposed a rule for conditioning upper
probabilities. Since possibility measures are upper probabilities induced by a
particular type of multi-valued mapping [7,15,22], Dempster’s rule can be
applied to the problem of defining conditional possibilities. This yields, for
x 2 X, y 2 Y:
pDExjy 
px;y
py if py > 0;
1 if py  0:

Strictly, Dempster’s rule does not determine pDExjy when py  0, but in
that case we adopt the least committal value pDExjy  1. This choice has no
eect on the coherence properties of Dempster’s rule. Conditional possibility
distributions pDEjy, y 2 Y, are always normal.
1.6. Renormalised Hisdal rules
As we have seen in Section 1.2, an arbitrary solution pjy of Hisdal’s
equation need not be normal. We can make it normal by dividing it by its
highest value jy  maxfpxjy : x 2 Xg, which according to Eq. (2) is
achieved by an x which maximises p; y. Consequently py6jy6 1. If we
treat all x which maximise p; y in the same way, i.e. give them the same value
of pxjy  jy, then the renormalised conditional possibility distribution
becomes, for x 2 X:
pjxjy 
px;y
jy if px; y < py;
1 if px; y  py:

Given a normal joint distribution p; , we can therefore produce normal
conditional distributions pjjy, y 2 Y, which are intermediate 3 between
pDPjy and pDEjy by considering any function j:Y! 0; 1 such that
pu6 ju6 1 for all u in Y. This gives Dempster’s rule when j  p and
the Dubois–Prade rule when j  1. In the sense described above, these inter-
mediate rules produce the renormalised versions of the (not necessarily normal)
3 Dempster’s rule yields conditional possibility distributions which dominate the ones given by
the Dubois–Prade rule: pDPxjy6pDExjy for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, and there is a strict inequality
pDPxjy < pDExjy if and only if 0 < px; y < py < 1. (In that case Dempster’s rule is
incompatible with Hisdal’s equation.)
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solutions to Hisdal’s equation. They will therefore be called renormalised
Hisdal rules.
1.7. Nguyen’s rule
In the rule proposed by Nguyen [17], pxjy depends on px as well as on
py and px; y:
pNGxjy  px; yminfpx; pyg=py if py > 0;1 if py  0:

This can be regarded as a modification of Dempster’s rule: pNGxjy6 pDExjy
for all x 2 X and y 2 Y, and the inequality is strict whenever px < 1 or
py < 1. Nguyen’s rule does not in general lead to solutions of Hisdal’s
equation. Somewhat similarly to Zadeh’s, Nguyen’s rule yields an unnormal-
ised conditional possibility distribution pNGjy whenever 0 < py < 1.
1.8. Transformed Dempster’s rules
Various authors [1,2,5,11] have suggested modifying Hisdal’s equation by
letting a more general operator, e.g. a triangular norm, take the place of min in
(1). This leads to the following relation between the conditional, marginal and
joint distributions:
px; y  T pxjy; py; x 2 X; y 2 Y; 3
where T is a triangular norm [19,20], i.e. a non-decreasing, commutative and
associative binary operator on the real unit interval [0,1], with neutral element
1 and absorbing element 0. There may in general be more than one value of
pxjy which satisfies relation (3) for given px; y and py. As in the special
case of the Dubois–Prade conditioning rule (Section 1.4), it therefore seems
reasonable to let pxjy be the greatest (least informative, least specific) solution
of Eq. (3). Such a solution is guaranteed to exist only if T is continuous. This
yields the Dubois–Prade rule for the choice T  min, and Dempster’s rule if we
let T be the (algebraic) product.
In recent work, De Baets et al. [1,2] have argued that T should furthermore
be strict, i.e. be Archimedean and have strictly increasing partial mappings.
This eectively restricts T to triangular norms which are related to the (alge-
braic) product in the following way: T  T/, where / is an order preserving
permutation of the real unit interval 0; 1 (i.e. a continuous, strictly increasing
function with /0  0 and /1  1), and
T/a; b  /ÿ1/a/b; a; b 2 0; 12:
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if py > 0
1 if py  0:
(
In an obvious way, this rule can be seen as a /-transform of Dempster’s rule. It
always produces normal conditional possibility distributions p/jy, y 2 Y.
Dempster’s rule is recovered if we let /a  ah, a 2 0; 1, where h > 0.
1.9. Natural extension
Another rule for conditioning possibility measures is produced by the
general technique of natural extension [24]. Let coA denote the set-
theoretic complement of A. For y 2 Y, define by  P X cofyg 




px;y1ÿmaxfpx;y;byg if by < 1;
1 if by  1:

The conditional possibility distributions pNEjy are always normal. Of course
pNEyjx is defined by analogous formulae, with by replaced by gx 
Pcofxg Y  maxfpu: u 2 X; u 6 xg.
There are several ways of deriving the formulae for natural extension.
Firstly, we will show in Section 5 that pNEjy is the largest (or least infor-
mative) conditional possibility distribution that is coherent with the joint dis-
tribution p; . A second derivation is based on the behavioural interpretation
of PA as a marginally acceptable rate for betting against A, as explained in
Section 2: it can be shown that PNEBjy  maxfpNExjy: x 2 Bg is the lowest
conditional betting rate that can be constructed by combining marginally ac-
ceptable unconditional bets. Formally,
PNEBjy  inf fl: IXfyglÿIBYP
X
AXY
kA P A ÿ IA; for some
non-negative function k defined on the power set of XYg;
or in other words, the natural extension PNEBjy is the infimum value of l such
that the reward from a bet against B conditional on y at betting rate l (which is
the left-hand side of the inequality) is everywhere at least as large as a positive
linear combination of marginally acceptable unconditional gambles. The idea
here is that we are committed to accept the gamble on the right-hand side (or a
gamble arbitrarily close to it) by betting against each event A at the marginally
acceptable rate (or arbitrarily close to it), and hence we should be willing to
accept the gamble on the left-hand side, which is equivalent to betting against B
conditional on y at rate l. In this sense, the natural extension pNEjy models
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the conditional betting behaviour that is entailed by the joint distribution
p; .
Thirdly, pNEjy can be derived as the upper envelope of all conditional
probability measures P jy which are consistent with some joint probability
measure that is dominated by the possibility measure P , where
P A  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 Ag. Formally, let P be the set of all probability
measures onXY, and letM be the set of all probability measures dominated
by P :
M  fP : P 2 P; P A6 P A for every A  XYg:
If by < 1 then P X fyg > 0 for each P in M, and we may apply Bayes’
rule to obtain the conditional probability P Bjy  P B fyg=P X fyg, for
any B  X. By taking the supremum over M, we obtain the upper envelope of
the conditional probability measures, PNEBjy  supfP Bjy: P 2Mg, for all
B  X. If by  1 then there is P in M for which P X fyg  0, and every
conditional probability measure P jy is consistent with such a P since Bayes’
rule is vacuous. The upper envelope of all these conditional probability mea-
sures is the vacuous upper probability, PNEBjy  1 if B  X and B 6 ;. We
will show, in the Corollary to Theorem 5, that PNEjy is the possibility
measure which has possibility distribution pNEjy.
The conditional distributions produced by natural extension dominate those
produced by all the other rules considered in this paper, and indeed they are
usually vacuous since pNExjy  1 unless by < 1. There can be at most one
y 2 Y such that by < 1, namely if y is the unique modal value (or mode) of
the marginal possibility distribution p of Y, i.e. the only value of v in Y such
that pv  1. If p is plurimodal, i.e. if it has more than one mode, then
pNExjy  1 for all x 2 X and y 2 Y and conditioning by natural extension is
completely uninformative.
1.10. Regular extension
The process of natural extension can be modified slightly to produce con-
ditional possibility distributions which are slightly more informative. If
py > 0, there are P in M such that P X fyg > 0, and we define the regular
extension as in Ref. [24, Appendix J]:
PREBjy  supfP Bjy: P 2M; PX fyg > 0g for all B  X:
(The natural extension is given by the same formula in the special case where
by < 1.) If py  0 then PX fyg  0 for all P in M and we let PREjy be
the vacuous upper probability. This process of regular extension again
produces PREjy that are possibility measures, with possibility distributions
given by
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pRExjy 
px;y
px;y1ÿmaxfpx;y;byg if by < 1;
0 if by  1 and py > px; y  0;
1 otherwise:
8<:
For possibility distributions, the natural extension is almost the same as the
regular extension; they disagree only when by  1 and py > px; y  0, in
which case pNExjy  1 and pRExjy  0.
1.11. Harmonic mean rule
We will see that, of the rules defined so far, only Dempster’s rule (and some
of its transforms) and natural or regular extension are coherent in the simplest
situation. However, both rules have defects: Dempster’s rule produces values
pDExjy that are too small to be coherent in more complicated situations,
whereas natural (or regular) extension produces values pNExjy that are usu-
ally too large to be useful. This suggests a new rule which takes pxjy to be
some kind of average of pDExjy and pNExjy. It turns out that the harmonic
mean is a suitable average; the new values pHMxjy are usually non-vacuous
and are coherent in both problems we study.
The harmonic mean rule produces the conditional possibilities:
pHMxjy 
2px;y
px;ypy1ÿmaxfpx;y;byg if py > 0;
1 if py  0:

By distinguishing cases, this can be broken down into the simpler formulae
pHMxjy 
1 if px; y  py;
0 if 0  px; y < py;
2px;y
px;ypy if 0 < px; y < py and by  1;
px; y if by6 px; y < py;
2px;y
px;y2ÿby if 0 < px; y < by < 1:
8>>><>>>:
Of the five cases in the preceding formulae, the last two will be relatively in-
frequent because they can occur for at most one y in Y (which must satisfy
by < 1), and the third case is the most common non-trivial case. The for-
mulae would not change if we defined pHMxjy to be the harmonic mean of
pDExjy and pRExjy, i.e. if we replaced natural extension by regular extension,
as the two disagree only when pDExjy  0, which implies pHMxjy  0 irre-
spective of whether natural or regular extension is used. Of course pHMyjx is
defined by analogous formulae, with py replaced by px and by replaced by
gx.
As expected, pDExjy6 pHMxjy6 pRExjy6pNExjy for all x 2 X and
y 2 Y, and it follows that pHMjy is always a normal possibility distribution.
Unlike natural extension, the harmonic mean rule has the non-vacuity property:
if px; y < py then pHMxjy < 1. Other properties of the rule are that
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pHMxjy is a continuous function of px; y, py and by when py > 0, it is a
non-decreasing function of px; y (and strictly increasing if 0 < px; y < py),
it is non-increasing in py, and it is non-decreasing in by.
2. Behavioural interpretation of possibility measures
We believe that, in order to build a useful theory of possibility, it is neces-
sary to begin with a specific interpretation of degrees of possibility. To un-
derstand the practical meaning of possibility measures, i.e. how they should be
used in practical reasoning, we need a behavioural interpretation that relates
possibility measures to decisions and actions. Provided the joint possibility
distribution p;  is normal, the corresponding possibility measure P is a co-
herent upper probability measure. It is therefore natural to adopt the behav-
ioural interpretation of upper probabilities. Essentially, upper probabilities are
marginally acceptable rates for betting against an event.
For A  XY, let GA  P A ÿ IA  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 Ag ÿ IA, where
IA denotes the indicator function of A. Then GA is the net reward from a bet
against A at betting rate P A: the outcome is a gain of P A if A does not
occur, and a loss of 1ÿ P A if A does occur. The behavioural interpretation of
the joint possibility distribution p;  is that the gambles GA are marginally
acceptable for all A  XY, and moreover that positive linear combinations
of such gambles are at least marginally acceptable. 4 (By marginally acceptable
we mean that GA  e is acceptable for any strictly positive e.) In other words,
P A is an infimum acceptable betting rate for betting against A.
The value P A of a possibility measure is usually called the ‘degree of
possibility’ or ‘degree of plausibility’ of A. This terminology is consistent with
the behavioural interpretation. Intuitively, an event is plausible to the extent
that we would not bet against it; and the less we are inclined to bet against an
event, the closer to one should be the infimum acceptable betting rate. In the
extreme case where an event A is fully plausible, there is no reason to bet
against it at any odds and the only acceptable betting rate is P A  1.
Next consider the behavioural interpretation of conditional possibility
measures. Suppose that a conditioning rule is used to calculate a conditional
degree of possibility PBjy  maxfpxjy: x 2 Bg, where B  X and y 2 Y.
This might be done to revise (update) uncertainty about the variable X after
learning that Y y, or to determine acceptable rates for betting against B when
the bet will be called o unless Y  y. These two dierent purposes correspond
4 Strictly, we need to assume that all gains and losses from betting are measured on a linear
utility scale. The way in which possibility measures are used to make decisions in more general
problems is outlined in Ref. [25].
72 P. Walley, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 63–107
to dierent interpretations of PBjy [24]. The first, called the updating inter-
pretation, is that P Bjy is the infimum acceptable rate for betting against B
that we would adopt if we learned only that Y  y. Under that interpretation,
P jy is the new (unconditional) possibility measure that we would use to
represent our uncertainty about X after learning that Y  y. The second, called
the contingent interpretation, is that P Bjy is the infimum acceptable rate for
betting against B contingent on Y  y, i.e. where the bet is called o unless
Y  y. Under both interpretations, P Bjy may be regarded as an infimum
acceptable rate for betting against B conditional on Y  y.
Betting against B contingent on Y  y at the marginal betting rate P Bjy
produces exactly the same outcome as betting against B after learning that Y  y;
in both cases the net reward is GBjy  IXfyg P Bjy ÿ IBY, where the factor
IXfyg indicates that the bet is null (either called o or never undertaken) unless
Y  y. It is therefore reasonable to require that P Bjy should have the same
numerical value under both interpretations. (This requirement is discussed in
Section 6.1 of Ref. [24], where it is called the Updating Principle.) We will assume
that the gambles GBjy and their positive linear combinations are marginally
acceptable for all B  X and y 2 Y, and similarly the gambles GCjx 
IfxgY P Cjx ÿ IXC are marginally acceptable for all C  Y and x 2 X.
3. Unnormalised possibility distributions
Under the behavioural interpretation, it is reasonable to require that the
conditional possibility distributions pjy and pjx, as well as the joint dis-
tribution p; , should be normal possibility distributions. If the joint distri-
bution is not normal then P XY  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 XYg < 1,
which means (under the behavioural interpretation of P ) that we are willing to
bet against the sure event XY at a betting rate smaller than one, which is
certain to result in a loss. Formally, an unnormalised possibility distribution
p;  fails to avoid sure loss in the sense of Section 4. It is therefore necessary
for p;  to be normal.
To argue that the conditional possibility distributions pjy should also be
normal, we need to consider their two interpretations. Under the updating
interpretation, pjy is the unconditional possibility distribution that we would
adopt if we learned only that Y  y. Whatever value of Y is observed, we want
the new possibility distribution to avoid sure loss, and this implies that pjy
must be normal for all y 2 Y.
Under the contingent interpretation, suppose that pjy is not normal
for some y 2 Y, so that P Xjy  maxfpxjy: x 2 Xg < 1. Then a bet
against the sure event X contingent on Y  y, at any betting rate
l such that P Xjy < l < 1, is acceptable. This bet has net reward
IXfyglÿ IXY  ÿ1ÿ lIXfyg. If Y  y then the bet is certain to produce a
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loss of 1ÿ l, and otherwise the bet is called o. Such an unfavourable bet
should not be acceptable, and again this implies that pjy must be normal for
all y 2 Y.
Technical Remark 1. The preceding bet does not produce a ‘sure loss’ in the
sense of Section 4, as it is not certain that Y  y. However, it does violate the
slightly stronger consistency condition in Ref. [28] and the criterion of ‘separate
coherence’ in Ref. [24, Section 6.2], each of which implies normality of pjy
for all y 2 Y. The criterion of avoiding sure loss in Section 4 implies normality
of p; , and it also implies normality of pjy in the special case where
by  P X cofyg < 1. The coherence criterion in Section 4 implies nor-
mality of pjy under the weaker assumption that py > 0. (Normality of
pjy is not necessary for coherence when py  0, but this case has little
practical significance as values y with py  0 are ‘not possible’.)
We will therefore require that the joint and conditional possibility distri-
butions p; , pjy, and pjx are always normal. This is equivalent to the
requirement that each of the corresponding possibility measures P , P jy and
P jx is coherent, when regarded as an unconditional upper probability mea-
sure [8,25,26].
Of the conditioning rules surveyed in Section 1, only the rules of Zadeh and
Nguyen can produce conditional possibility distributions that are unnormal-
ised. Zadeh’s rule produces an unnormalised pZAjy whenever py < 1. In
that case, after we learn that Y  y, the updated possibility distribution pZAjy
produces a sure loss since it gives P Xjy < 1. Indeed the same problem may
arise directly from the conditional possibility distribution, without considering
the associated possibility measure, as the following example shows.
Example 1. Let X  fx1; x2g and Y  fy1; y2; . . . ; yng. Define py for all y 2 Y
such that py1  1 and pyi < 12 if i 6 1. To be specific, we take pyi  14
whenever i 6 1. Let px; y  py for all x 2 X. Then Zadeh’s conditioning
rule gives pZAxjy  px; y  py for all x; y 2 XY. Suppose that we
learn that Y  yi where i 6 1. Then the new betting rate for betting against fxg
is pZAxjyi  14, and the gamble 14ÿ Ifxg is marginally acceptable, for each
x 2 X. But the net reward from the two bets against fx1g and fx2g is
1
2
ÿ IX  12ÿ 1  ÿ 12, which is a sure loss. This arises directly from the values of
pZAxjy, which are too small to be reasonable betting rates when y 6 y1.
Nguyen’s rule, which yields an unnormalised pNGjy whenever
0 < py < 1, has similar defects. Rules such as Zadeh’s and Nguyen’s, which
may produce unnormalised conditional possibility distributions, are therefore
unreasonable under a behavioural interpretation, and we will assume nor-
mality in the rest of this paper. Any such rule can be easily modified to nor-
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malise pjy, by dividing by the largest value maxfpxjy: x 2 Xg. For example,
normalising Zadeh’s rule produces the modified rule pxjy  px; y=py
whenever py > 0, which agrees with Dempster’s rule, and we will see that this
avoids the problems illustrated in the previous example.
4. General consistency criteria
We now examine whether a conditioning rule produces conditional possi-
bilities pxjy that are consistent or ‘coherent’ with the unconditional joint
possibilities px; y. The joint and conditional possibility distributions, p; 
and pjy, generate upper probability measures P and P jy through the
formulae in Section 1, so we need to consider whether P and P jy are coherent
under a behavioural interpretation. A conditioning rule should specify pjy
for every possible value of y, so we should look at consistency of the set
f P jy: y 2 Yg with P . We will consider two problems.
Problem 1. Normal possibility distributions p;  and pjy are defined for all
y 2 Y. Hence P A and P Bjy are defined for all A  XY, B  X and
y 2 Y, and P and P jy are normal possibility measures (for all y in Y).
Problem 2. Normal possibility distributions p; , pjy and pjx are defined
for all y 2 Y and x 2 X. Hence, in addition to the quantities specified in
Problem 1, P Cjx is defined for all C  Y and x 2 X, and P jx is a normal
possibility measure for all x in X.
To motivate Problem 2, note that we can use a conditioning rule to con-
dition on x just as well as on y, and there are many problems in which we
would want to calculate both conditional distributions pjx and pjy from
the joint distribution p; .
What do we mean by ‘consistency’? We introduce two properties, called
‘avoiding sure loss’ and ‘coherence’, which are closely related to the behav-
ioural interpretation of upper probability.
4.1. Avoiding sure loss
Recall from Section 2 that, according to the behavioural interpretation,
the gambles GA  PA ÿ IA  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 Ag ÿ IA and GBjy 
IXfyg P Bjy ÿ IBY  IXfygmaxfpxjy: x 2 Bg ÿ IBY are marginally ac-
ceptable, for all A  XY, B  X and y 2 Y. There are only finitely many
gambles of the form GA and GBjy, since X and Y are both finite. We say
that P and f P jy: y 2 Yg – or p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg – avoid sure loss when,
for every positive linear combination of these marginally acceptable gambles, it
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is possible for the net outcome to be non-negative. In other words, P and
f P jy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and only if there is no positive linear combi-
nation of marginally acceptable gambles which is certain to produce a net loss.
Formally, for any non-negative real functions k and l, where kA is defined for








 x; yP 0, i.e.X
AXY
kA P A ÿ IAx; y 
X
BX
lB; y P Bjy ÿ IBxP 0: 4
If this fails, the joint and conditional possibility distributions are inconsistent
in the strong sense that they would lead us to accept gambles which are certain
to produce an overall loss.
Turning now to Problem 2, we strengthen condition (4) by adding to the
left-hand side an arbitrary positive linear combination of the marginally ac-
ceptable gambles GCjx, with non-negative weights sC; x, where C  Y and
x 2 X. That is, we say that P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and f P jx: x 2 Xg – or p; ,
fpjy: y 2 Yg and fpjx: x 2 Xg – avoid sure loss when there is no positive
linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles which is certain to pro-
duce a net loss. Formally, for any non-negative real functions k, l and s, there
are x 2 X and y 2 Y such thatX
AXY
kA P A ÿ IAx; y 
X
BX




sC; x P Cjx ÿ ICyP 0:
5
For both Problems 1 and 2, avoiding sure loss can be characterised in terms of
probability measures, as follows.
Theorem 1. With the earlier assumptions of Problems 1 and 2,
1. P and f Pjy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and only if there are probability mea-
sures P (defined on the power set of XY) and fP jy: y 2 Yg (each defined
on the power set of X) such that
(a) P A6 PA  maxfpx; y: x; y 2 Ag whenever A  XY,
(b) P Bjy6 P Bjy  maxfpxjy: x 2 Bg whenever B  X, y 2 Y,
(c) for all y 2 Y, P and Pjy satisfy Bayes’ rule, i.e. P Bjy  P B
fyg=P X fyg whenever the denominator is non-zero, for all B  X;
2. P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and f P jx: x 2 Xg avoid sure loss if and only if there are
probability measures P and fP jy: y 2 Yg satisfying all the conditions of 1,
and probability measures fPjx: x 2 Xg (each defined on the power set of
Y) such that
(d) P Cjx6 PCjx  maxfpyjx: y 2 Cg whenever C  Y, x 2 X,
(e) P and P jx satisfy Bayes’ rule for all x 2 X.
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Conditions (c) and (e) (Bayes’ rule) are vacuous when P X fyg  0 or
P fxg Y  0; in these cases (c) and (e) put no constraints whatsoever on the
conditional probabilities P jy and Pjx. This is especially important when P
is a normal possibility measure, since there are many joint probability measures
P which satisfy (a) and have P X fyg  0 or P fxg Y  0 for most
values of y or x. Indeed px1; y1  1 for some x1; y1 2 XY, so the degen-
erate probability mass function defined by P x1; y1  1 and P x; y  0 if x; y
6 x1; y1 will satisfy (a) and have P X fyg  P fxg Y  0 whenever x 6
x1 and y 6 y1. Then conditions (c) and (e) become vacuous except when y  y1
or x  x1, and it is easy to find conditional probabilities P jy and P jx that
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. This means that, as we will now verify, it is
very easy for a conditioning rule to avoid sure loss.
Any rule for defining conditional possibilities which satisfies the simple
condition (6) in the next theorem must avoid sure loss. This condition is sat-
isfied by all the conditioning rules that we consider in this paper, and indeed it
is hard to imagine anyone advocating a rule which violates the condition. 5
Theorem 2. Suppose that the conditioning rule satisfies
8x; y 2 XYpx; y  1) pxjy  1: 6
Then p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss. Provided the rule satisfies (6) and
the analogous condition with x and y interchanged, p; , fpjy: y 2 Yg and
fpjx: x 2 Xg avoid sure loss.
The sucient condition (6), and the analogous one with x and y inter-
changed, is satisfied by all the conditioning rules in Section 1, including the
rules of Zadeh and Nguyen, so each of the rules avoids sure loss in both
Problems 1 and 2. Avoiding sure loss is too weak to discriminate between these
rules. However, a stronger consistency requirement, called ‘coherence’, does
discriminate between the rules.
4.2. Coherence
Recall from Section 2 the behavioural interpretation of GA  P A ÿ IA
and GBjy  IXfyg P Bjy ÿ IBY as marginally acceptable gambles. By
forming positive linear combinations of such gambles, we can construct new
gambles which should be, at least, marginally acceptable. If there is such a
positive linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles that is uniformly
smaller than GA, then the overall eect of this combination of gambles is that
5 Condition (6) is also a consequence of the coherence criterion defined in Section 4.2; this
follows immediately from Eq. (12).
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we bet against A at a rate smaller than PA. This is inconsistent with our
interpretation of P A as an infimum acceptable betting rate, and in this case we
say that the model is incoherent. A second type of incoherence can occur when
a positive linear combination of marginally acceptable gambles is uniformly
smaller than GBjy. These two types of incoherence indicate that the condi-
tional possibility distributions pjy are inconsistent with the joint distribution
p; .
The formal definition of coherence is as follows. We say that P and
f P jy: y 2 Yg – or p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg – are coherent when they avoid
sure loss and also satisfy the conditions that, for all non-negative real functions
k and l, Ao  XY, Bo  X and vo 2 Y,
(i) there are x 2 X and y 2 Y such that PAXY kAGA P
v2Y
P
BX lB; vGBjv ÿ GAox; yP 0, i.e.X
AXY
kA P A ÿ IAx; y 
X
BX
lB; y P Bjy ÿ IBx
P P AoÿIAox; y; 7
(ii) there are x 2 X and y 2 Y such that PAXY kAGA
Pv2Y PBX lB; vGBjv ÿ GBojvox; yP 0, i.e.X
AXY
kA P A ÿ IAx; y 
X
BX
lB; y P Bjy ÿ IBx
P Ifvogy P Bojvo ÿ IBox: 8
If condition (i) fails, the upper probability P Ao can be reduced, in eect, by
using the information on the left-hand side of Eq. (7) which is provided by the
joint and conditional possibility distributions. If (ii) fails, the conditional upper
probability P Bojvo can be reduced in a similar way. In both cases the col-
lection of joint and conditional possibility distributions is inconsistent.
Remark 1. These two types of incoherence have quite dierent significance
in the problems studied in this paper, as we assume that the joint
distribution p;  is given or fixed, and we want to define pjy in terms
of p;  using a conditioning rule. If condition (ii) failed, we could use it
to obtain a more informative (i.e. smaller) value of P Bojvo, and thus we
could use it to correct or improve the conditioning rule. But if condition
(i) fails, we must modify the joint distribution, which is assumed to be
fixed, rather than the conditional ones. So failure of condition (i) seems
in this problem to be a ‘worse’ or less constructive type of incoherence
than failure of (ii). Unfortunately, for the rules we consider, it is (i) that
fails rather than (ii). That can be partly explained by the following
remark.
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Remark 2. Although the coherence conditions (i) and (ii) appear to be quite
similar, condition (ii) is almost trivial in the present problem. In fact (ii) holds
provided that the conditioning rule satisfies (6) and there is y1 2 Y such that
y1 6 vo and py1  1. (To see that, take x; y  x1; y1 in (8), where x1 is such
that px1; y1  py1.) So condition (ii) has force only when vo is the unique
element y of Y with py  1, that is, when bvo < 1.
Technical Remark 2. In Problem 1, assuming normality of the joint and
conditional possibility distributions, the preceding definitions of avoiding sure
loss and coherence are essentially equivalent to those in Chapter 6 of Ref. [24]
and in Ref. [28]. However, the following definition of coherence for Problem 2
is slightly weaker than the definition in Chapter 7 of Ref. [24] and that in Ref.
[28]; it is equivalent to what is called ‘weak coherence’ in Ref. [24]. The stronger
concept of coherence rules out combinations of acceptable bets whose net
outcome is certain to be non-positive but not necessarily negative, i.e. not
necessarily a ‘sure loss’. For an example of the dierence between the two
definitions, involving degenerate possibility measures, see Example 7.3.5 of
Ref. [24]. The stronger concept of coherence appears to be a reasonable
consistency requirement, but it is more complicated than the weaker concept
studied in this paper. As the conditioning rules that have been proposed
previously violate even the weaker property of coherence, we will not study the
stronger concept in this paper.
The preceding definition of coherence can be extended in a straightforward
way to Problem 2 by adding terms
P
CY sC; x PCjx ÿ ICy to the left-
hand sides of Eqs. (7) and (8), to allow an arbitrary positive linear combination
of marginally acceptable gambles GCjx, and adding a third condition, anal-
ogous to (ii), that requires consistency of P Cojuo with the other quantities,
where Co  Y, uo 2 X.
Avoiding sure loss and coherence can be verified in general by using linear
programming techniques to solve a finite system of linear inequalities. Alter-
natively one can solve the dual linear program; see Theorem 3 below, or (more
simply) Lemmas 2 and 3 of the Appendix. In Problem 1, coherence can be
verified directly from Theorem 4, without using linear programming.
Coherence can be characterised in terms of probability measures, by
strengthening the characterisation of avoiding sure loss given in Theorem 1.
Whereas avoiding sure loss is equivalent to the existence of probability mea-
sures that are dominated by P and P jy and related by Bayes’ rule, coherence
is equivalent to P and P jy being upper envelopes of probability measures that
are related by Bayes’ rule. We say that P is the upper envelope of a set of
probability measures fPc: c 2 Cg when P A  supfPcA: c 2 Cg for all sets A
in the domain of P .
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Theorem 3. With the earlier assumptions of Problems 1 and 2,
1. P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent if and only if, for some non-empty set C,
for every y 2 Y and c 2 C, there are probability measures Pc (defined on the
power set of XY) and Pcjy (defined on the power set of X) such that
(a) P is the upper envelope of fPc: c 2 Cg,
(b) for each y 2 Y, P jy is the upper envelope of fPcjy: c 2 Cg,
(c) for each y 2 Y and c 2 C, Pc and Pcjy satisfy Bayes’ rule: PcBjy 
PcB fyg=PcX fyg whenever the denominator is non-zero and B  X;
2. P , f Pjy: y 2 Yg and f P jx: x 2 Xg are coherent if and only if, for every
y 2 Y, x 2 X and c 2 C, there are probability measures Pc, Pcjy and
Pcjx (defined on the power set ofY) which satisfy the conditions of 1 and also
(d) for each x 2 X, P jx is the upper envelope of fPcjx: c 2 Cg,
(e) for each x 2 X and c 2 C, Pc and Pcjx satisfy Bayes’ rule: PcCjx 
Pcfxg  C=Pcfxg Y whenever the denominator is non-zero and
C  Y.
It follows from results in Section 6.5.7 of Ref. [24] that probability measures P
and fP jy: y 2 Yg are coherent if and only if they satisfy Bayes’ rule (c). So
part 1 of Theorem 3 says that P and f Pjy: y 2 Yg are coherent if and only if
they are upper envelopes of sets fPc: c 2 Cg and fPcjy: c 2 Cg where the
corresponding probability measures Pc and fPcjy: y 2 Yg are coherent for
every c 2 C. Similarly in Problem 2 it can be shown that the two versions of
Bayes’ rule, (c) and (e), are necessary and sucient for coherence of probability
measures P , fP jy: y 2 Yg and fPjx: x 2 Xg, so again P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and
f P jx: x 2 Xg are coherent if and only if they are upper envelopes of coherent
probability measures.
All the conditioning rules we consider start with a normal joint possibility
distribution p;  and produce conditional possibility distributions pjy,
y 2 Y, and pjx, x 2 X. We say that a conditioning rule is coherent in
Problem 1 if for all normal joint distributions p;  it yields conditional dis-
tributions pjy, y 2 Y, such that p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are coherent. A
similar definition applies to coherence of a conditioning rule in Problem 2.
4.3. Consistency in terms of the possibility distributions
In verifying condition (4), we need only to consider sets A of the form
Ax; y  fu; v 2 XY: pu; v6 px; yg for some x; y 2 XY. That is
because any A can be replaced by the larger set Ax; y where x; y maximises
pu; v over A, since P Ax; y  P A  px; y and hence GAx; y6GA.
Similarly we need only to consider sets B of the form Bxjy 
fu 2 X: pujy6 pxjyg for some x 2 X. This observation, together with the
fact that possibility measures are zero at the empty set, allows us to restate the
condition for avoiding sure loss purely in terms of the joint and conditional
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possibility distributions: p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and only if,
for every function k:XY! R and l:XY! R; there are x 2 X and
y 2 Y such thatX
u;v2XY




lw; ypwjy ÿ Dpx; wjyP 0; 9
where R is the set of non-negative real numbers and
Dpx; y; u; v  1 if px; y6 pu; v;0 otherwise;

Dpx; wjy  1 if pxjy6 pwjy;0 otherwise:

A similar characterisation can be given for avoiding sure loss in Problem 2,
with an additional term
P
z2Y sx; zpzjx ÿ Dpy; zjx on the left-hand side,
where s is any function from XY to R, and
Dpy; zjx  1 if pyjx6pzjx;0 otherwise:

In Eq. (9), the quantity in the first square brackets is the reward from a bet
against the event that the outcome x; y has degree of possibility no greater
than u; v. The quantity in the second square brackets is the reward from a
similar bet made after observing y. So the left-hand side of Eq. (9) is a weighted
non-negative combination of unconditional bets and bets conditional on y. The
condition says that there is a possible outcome x; y for which the net reward is
non-negative.
The same observations can be made for the coherence conditions (7) and (8).
In addition, in verifying condition (7), we can restrict ourselves to sets Ao that
are singletons. Any Ao can be replaced by the smaller set fxo; yog where xo; yo
maximises p;  over Ao, because PAo  P fxo; yog  pxo; yo and hence
GAo6Gfxo; yog. Similarly, in (8) we need only to consider sets Bo that are
singletons. Hence p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are coherent if and only if they
avoid sure loss and also, for every function k : XY! R and
l : XY! R, and for every xo; yo and wo; zo in XY,
(i) there are x 2 X and y 2 Y such thatX
u;v2XY
ku; vpu; v ÿ Dpx; y; u; v 
X
w2X
lw; ypwjy ÿ Dpx; wjy
P pxo; yo ÿ Ifxo;yogx; y; 10
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(ii) there are x 2 X and y 2 Y such thatX
u;v2XY
ku; vpu; v ÿ Dpx; y; u; v 
X
w2X
lw; ypwjy ÿ Dpx; wjy
P Ifzogypwojzo ÿ Ifwogx: 11
A similar characterisation can be given for coherence in Problem 2, only now
with the additional term
P
z2Y sx; zpzjx ÿ Dpy; zjx appearing in the left-
hand sides, where s is any function from XY to R, and a third condition
analogous to (ii) but with the right-hand side of (11) replaced by
Ifuogxpvojuo ÿ Ifvogy, where uo can take any value in X and vo any value
in Y.
In both Eqs. (10) and (11), the left-hand side is the same weighted combi-
nation of bets that appears in Eq. (9). The right-hand side in Eq. (10) is the
reward from a bet against xo; yo. If Eq. (10) fails then pxo; yo is too high: it
can be reduced by combining the bets on the left-hand side to produce, in
eect, a bet against xo; yo at a rate lower than pxo; yo. Similarly, if Eq. (11)
fails then pwojzo is too high.
It should by now come as no surprise that the conditions of Theorem 1 can
also be formulated in terms of the joint and conditional possibility distribu-
tions. Indeed, conditions (a), (b) and (d) of Theorem 1 are respectively
equivalent to
(a0) P fu; v 2 XY: pu; v6 px; yg6 px; y whenever x 2 X, y 2 Y
(b0) P fu 2 X: pujy6 pxjygjy6 pxjy whenever x 2 X, y 2 Y
(d0) P fv 2 Y: pvjx6pyjxgjx6 pyjx whenever x 2 X, y 2 Y.
5. Coherence in Problem 1
In this section we give a simple characterisation of coherence in Problem 1,
where a joint possibility distribution p;  and conditional possibility distri-
butions pjy are specified. First we derive two necessary conditions for co-
herence, which will later be shown to be sucient. Suppose that, under the
assumptions of Problem 1, p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are coherent. Then, for all
x in X and y in Y,
pxjyP pDExjy  px; ypy if py > 0 12
and
pxjy6pNExjy; 13
where pNExjy is defined by the formulae in Section 1.9. Thus any coherent
rule must produce conditional possibilities which lie between the values defined
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by Dempster’s rule and natural extension. Since py6 1 and px; yP 0, it
follows from Eq. (12) that pxjyP px; y for all x in X and y in Y.
The inequalities (12) and (13) can be derived directly from Eqs. (7) and
(8) in the definition of coherence (see the proof of Theorem 4 in the Ap-
pendix). However, it is more insightful to consider the betting arguments
that lead to these inequalities, as these demonstrate the way in which vio-
lation of (12) or (13) produces inconsistency. First consider a bet against
fyg, with stake pxjy, at the marginally acceptable betting rate py. The
net reward from this bet is pxjypy ÿ IXfyg. Consider also a marginally
acceptable bet against fxg conditional on y, with stake 1, at betting rate
pxjy. This has reward IXfygpxjy ÿ IfxgY. When the two bets are
combined, the overall reward is the sum pxjypy ÿ IXfygIfxgY 
pxjypy ÿ Ifx;yg, which is the reward from a bet against fx; yg at
betting rate pxjypy. Because px; y is interpreted as an infimum accept-
able betting rate, it is necessary for coherence that px; y6pxjypy,
which implies Eq. (12).
A similar argument can be used to establish Eq. (13). Consider marginally
acceptable bets against fx; yg, with stake 1ÿ pxjy and betting rate px; y,
and against fx; yg [X cofyg, with stake pxjy and betting rate
P fx; yg [X cofyg  maxfpu; v: u; v  x; y or v 6 yg  maxfpx; y;
byg. Writing Ifx;yg[Xcofyg  Ifx;yg  1ÿ IXfyg and c  px; y ÿ pxjy
px; y  1ÿmaxfpx; y; byg, the overall reward from the two bets is
1ÿpxjypx; y ÿ Ifx;yg  pxjymaxfpx; y; byg ÿ Ifx;yg[Xcofyg IXfyg
pxjy ÿIfxgY  c. This is the reward from a marginally acceptable bet against
fxg conditional on y, plus the constant reward c. Because pxjy is interpreted
as an infimum acceptable betting rate, it is necessary for coherence that c P 0,
which implies Eq. (13).
Failure of Eq. (12) means that, by combining marginally acceptable gam-
bles, we can be forced to bet against fx; yg at a rate pxjypy that is lower
than the asserted infimum rate px; y. Similarly, failure of Eq. (13) means that
we can be forced to bet against fxg conditional on y at a rate that is lower than
the asserted infimum rate pxjy.
The conditional possibilities produced by the Dubois–Prade rule are related
to those produced by Dempster’s rule and natural extension by
pDPxjy6 pDExjy6 pNExjy for all x 2 X; y 2 Y:
It follows from Eq. (12) that the Dubois–Prade rule is incoherent whenever
pDPxjy < pDExjy, which happens whenever 0 < px; y < py < 1. For-
mally, the Dubois–Prade rule violates coherence condition (7), taking
Ao  fx; yg, kA  px; y when A  X fyg and kA  0 otherwise,
lB; v  1 when B  fxg and v  y, and lB; v otherwise. To illustrate
what goes wrong with the Dubois–Prade rule, consider a simple numerical
example.
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Example 2. Let the two possibility spaces be X  fa; bg and Y  fc; dg. Define
a joint possibility distribution p;  by pa; c  pb; c  1, pa; d  1
4
and
pb; d  1
5
. Since pb; d < pd  1
4
, the Dubois–Prade rule gives
pDPbjd  pb; d  15. This value is much smaller than the lower bound in
Eq. (12), pDEbjd  pb; d=pd  45, and therefore pDPbjd is incoherent
with p; . If we take pDPbjd  15 as a conditional betting rate, combining the
two marginally acceptable gambles in the proof of (12) is equivalent to betting
against fb; dg at rate pDPbjdpd  120, which is inconsistent with the given
infimum betting rate pb; d  1
5
.
In [10,12–14], Dubois and Prade propose a definition of conditional possi-
bilities for events A and B: PDPAjB  P A \ B if P A \ B < PB and
PDPAjB  1 if P A \ B  P B. The preceding argument shows that the
quantities PDPAjB, P A \ B and P B are incoherent whenever
0 < P A \ B < P B < 1.
So the Dubois–Prade rule is not coherent even in the simpler Problem 1. It
will therefore not be coherent in Problem 2 either. It also has other defects,
especially that it is discontinuous as px; y ! py. For example, if
X  fx1; x2g, px1; y  10ÿ6 and px2; y  1ÿ e10ÿ6, where e > 0, then
pDPx1jy  1 and pDPx2jy  1ÿ e10ÿ6 ! 10ÿ6 as e! 0. This seems absurd.
To be fair to Dubois and Prade, it must be pointed out that they proposed their
conditioning rule in an ordinal version of possibility theory, where possibility
values are not restricted to the unit interval but may belong to an arbitrary
chain, and they did not consider the rule in a numerical context. In the ordinal
version, discontinuity and incoherence are not applicable. Nevertheless, our
arguments indicate that the Dubois–Prade rule should not be used in the nu-
merical version of possibility theory.
Similarly we can see that the renormalised versions of all the solutions to
Hisdal’s equation are incoherent, except for the extreme case of Dempster’s
rule. The argument showing incoherence of the Dubois–Prade rule shows that
a renormalised Hisdal rule is incoherent whenever pjxjy < px; y=py for
some x; y, which happens whenever there are x; y such that
0 < px; y < py < jy6 1.
An argument similar to that for the Dubois–Prade rule shows that Ramer’s
rule is incoherent in Problem 1 (and a fortiori in Problem 2). For any y 2 Y, it
yields values pRAxjy which are incoherent with p;  whenever 0 < px; y <
py < 1. It will also be incoherent if 0 < px; y  py < 1, provided that
there is another xo in X such that pxo; y  py and we have assigned the
value 1 to pRAxojy and not to pRAxjy.
The conditioning rules of Zadeh and Nguyen, which can produce unnor-
malised conditional distributions but which do avoid sure loss in general, are
also incoherent in Problem 1. Zadeh’s rule violates condition (12) whenever
px; y > 0 and py < 1. Nguyen’s rule violates (12) whenever px; y > 0 and
minfpx; pyg < 1.
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We have shown that conditions (12) and (13) are necessary for coherence.
The next theorem shows that these conditions are also sucient for coherence
in Problem 1. This gives a complete characterisation of coherence in Problem 1:
a conditioning rule is coherent if and only if it is intermediate between De-
mpster’s rule and natural extension. Given a joint possibility distribution for
which py > 0, Dempster’s rule produces the smallest (most informative)
conditional possibilities that are coherent, and natural extension produces the
largest (least informative) conditional possibilities that are coherent.
Theorem 4. Normal possibility distributions p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are
coherent if and only if the values pxjy satisfy
pDExjy6 pxjy6 pNExjy whenever py > 0;
for all x in X and y in Y.
Remark 3. It is remarkable that the coherence conditions (7) and (8), which
appear to impose complicated relationships between the possibility distribu-
tions p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg, are actually equivalent to the simple bounds
(12) and (13). Since the possible (coherent) values of pxjy depend only on
px; y, py and by, the values of pxjy and pujv can be chosen
independently when u; v 6 x; y; coherence does not impose any relationship
between them, except through p; . These simple results do not extend to
Problem 2, where the coherence relationships, e.g. (15) and (16) below, are
considerably more complicated.
Remark 4. The conditional possibility pxjy is uniquely determined by the
inequalities in Theorem 4 if and only if py > 0 and pDExjy  pNExjy. That
happens if and only if (a) px; y  py > 0, which implies that pxjy  1, or
(b) px; yP by, which gives pxjy  px; y. In other cases the interval of
coherent values for pxjy may be very wide. For example, if px; y  0 and
by  1 then pxjy can take any value in the interval 0; 1. There can be at
most one value of y with by < 1, and the upper bound in Theorem 4 is
vacuous, i.e. pNExjy  1, for all other y in Y and all x in X.
Remark 5. When py  0, Theorem 4 imposes no restrictions on pxjy, and
pjy can be taken to be any normal possibility distribution without aecting
coherence. This indeterminacy mirrors the indeterminacy of conditional
probabilities P jy in classical probability theory when PX fyg  0. The
case py  0 appears to have no practical importance, at least when Y is finite,
because the event C  fy 2 Y: py  0g is ‘practically impossible’ in the sense
that we should be willing to bet against its occurrence at any odds, since
P C  0. But if C does not occur then the conditional distributions pjy for
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which py  0 will have no eect on behaviour; the corresponding bets will
always be called o. Notice also that if py  0 then px; y  0 for all x 2 X
and there is no useful information in the joint possibility distribution p; 
from which pjy can be constructed. It is therefore not surprising that pjy
can be chosen arbitrarily.
Remark 6. Theorem 4 establishes that Dempster’s rule is coherent in Problem
1. However, this result relies on P being a possibility measure. It is well known
that if P is a more general type of upper probability measure (such as a
plausibility function) and P jy is defined by Dempster’s rule
P Bjy  P B fyg= P X fyg, then P and f P jy: y 2 Yg may be incoher-
ent, and indeed they may not even avoid sure loss. See Ref. [25] and Section
5.13 of Ref. [24] for examples.
Theorem 4 tells us that the transformed Dempster’s rule for a given order-
preserving permutation / of the unit interval (Section 1.8) is coherent in
Problem 1 if and only if / satisfies /abP /a/b for all a; b 2 0; 12, that
is, if and only if the triangular norm T/ is pointwise dominated by the algebraic
product.
The new rule defined in Section 1.11 yields values pHMxjy which are the
harmonic mean of the values pDExjy and pNExjy. The new rule is therefore
intermediate between Dempster’s rule and natural extension, and hence co-
herent in Problem 1, by Theorem 4. The same is true of regular extension.
6. Coherence in Problem 2
Of the conditioning rules surveyed in the Introduction, essentially only four
are coherent in Problem 1: Dempster’s rule (and some of its transforms), natural
extension, regular extension and the harmonic mean rule. In this section we
investigate which of these rules are coherent also in Problem 2, when they are
used to define both fpjx: x 2 Xg and fpjy: y 2 Yg. Since coherence is a
stronger requirement in Problem 2 than in Problem 1, conditions (12) and (13),
and their analogous versions with x and y interchanged, are necessary for co-
herence in Problem 2. The following three inequalities, which relate the quan-
tities pxjy, pyjx and px; y, are also necessary for coherence in Problem 2:
px; y6 pxjypyjxmaxfpx; pyg
pxjy  pyjx ÿ pxjypyjx ; 14
where 0/0 is taken to be 0;
px; y6 pxjypyjxmaxfpyju: u 2 cofxgg
pxjymaxfpyju: u 2 cofxgg  pyjx ÿ pxjypyjx ; 15
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provided the denominator is non-zero; and
px; y6 pyjxpxjymaxfpxjv: v 2 cofygg
pyjxmaxfpxjv: v 2 cofygg  pxjy ÿ pyjxpxjy ; 16
provided the denominator is non-zero. Conditions (14)–(16) are considerably
more complicated than (12) and (13), which indicates that the coherence re-
lationships are much more involved in Problem 2 than in Problem 1. (16) is
obtained from (15) by interchanging x and y. Although Eqs. (15) and (16) look
similar to Eq. (14), the three conditions are logically independent.







The three conditions generalise from possibility distributions to coherent upper
probabilities, and Eq. (14) also generalises from variables to events: if A and B
are any two events, it is necessary for coherence of the quantities P AjB,
P BjA, PA \ B and P A [ B that
P A \ B6
P AjB P BjA P A [ B
P AjB  P BjA ÿ P AjB P BjA : 17
When the joint upper probability P is a probability measure and the condi-
tional probabilities are defined by Bayes’ rule, Eq. (17) is satisfied with
equality.
Again we will outline the betting arguments that lead to Eqs. (14) and (15).
Eq. (14) holds if pxjy  0, since then px; y6 pxjypy  0 by Eq. (12), and
similarly if pyjx  0. Suppose that pxjy > 0 and pyjx > 0. Define f 
pxjy  pyjx ÿ pxjypyjx (so f > 0, j  pyjx=f, m  pxjy=f, and
l  pxjypyjx=f. Consider three marginally acceptable gambles: a bet
against fxg conditional on y at rate pxjy with stake j; a bet against fyg
conditional on x at rate pyjx with stake m; and a bet against C  fxg Y [
X fyg at rate P C  maxfpx; pyg, with stake l. Using the identities
IC  IfxgY  IXfyg ÿ Ifx;yg and j mÿ l  1, the overall reward from the
three bets is jIXfygpxjy ÿ IfxgY  mIfxgYpyjx ÿ IXfyg  l P C ÿ IC
 l P C ÿ Ifx;yg. This is the reward from a bet against fx; yg at rate
l P C  l maxfpx;pyg. Since px; y is the infimum acceptable rate for
betting against fx; yg, it is necessary for coherence that px; y
6 l maxfpx; pyg, which establishes Eq. (14). To derive Eq. (17), replace
fxg Y, X fyg, pxjy, pyjx, px; y and P C in the preceding argument by
A, B, P AjB, P BjA, P A \ B and P A [ B respectively.
Eq. (15) can be derived in a similar way by combining marginally acceptable
bets against fxg conditional on y, against fyg conditional on x, and against fyg
conditional on u for every u in cofxg, with stakes proportional to pyjx,
P. Walley, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 63–107 87
pxjymaxfpyju: u 2 cofxgg, and pxjypyjx respectively. The derivation of
Eq. (16) is similar, with x and y interchanged.
The inequalities (12)–(16), and the versions of Eqs. (12) and (13) with x and
y interchanged, are therefore necessary for coherence in Problem 2. It appears
that, in the simplest non-trivial case where the possibility spaces X and Y each
have only two elements, these conditions are also sucient for coherence.
Dempster’s rule is coherent in Problem 1, when it is used to define pjy, but
it is not coherent in Problem 2, when it is used to define both pjy and pjx.
To show what goes wrong with Dempster’s rule in Problem 2, we give a simple
numerical example.
Example 3. Let the two possibility spaces be X  fa; bg and Y  fc; dg. Define
the joint possibility distribution p;  by pb; d  1
2
and px; y  1 if
x; y 6 b; d. Dempster’s rule gives conditional possibilities
pDEbjd  pDEdjb  12. These values violate Eq. (14), taking x  b and
y  d, as the right-hand side of (14) is seen to be 1
3
which is smaller than
pb; d  1
2
. In betting terms, when we combine marginally acceptable bets
against fbg conditional on d and against fdg conditional on b (each with stake
2
3
, the overall reward is no greater than that from a bet against fb; dg at rate
1
3
. This is inconsistent with the interpretation of pb; d  1
2
as an infimum
acceptable rate for betting against fb; dg. Conditions (15) and (16) are also
violated for x; y  b; d.
The inconsistency can be understood in another way, using the comparative
probability relation ‘is at least as probable as’, which we denote by . (That is
possible because the three values pb; d, pDEbjd and pDEdjb in the pre-
ceding argument are each 1
2
.) When px  1
2
we can infer that cofxg  fxg
(i.e. fxg is no more probable than its complement), since P cofxg 
1ÿ px  1
2
P px  P fxg. Now suppose we learn that x  b. This re-
duces the joint possibility space to fb; c; b; dg. Since pDEdjb  12, c  d
after learning x  b. Because the only eect of learning x  b is to eliminate two
possibilities, we must have b; c  b; d initially. Similarly, because
pDEbjd  12, a; d  b; d initially. Thus, initially, both b; c and a; d are
at least as probable as b; d. The maximum possible upper probability for
b; d is therefore 1
3
, which is inconsistent with the given upper probability
pb; d  1
2
.
Dempster’s rule produces incoherence quite generally in Problem 2. By
substituting the values pDExjy  px; y=py and pDEyjx  px; y=px in
Eq. (14), we find that Dempster’s rule satisfies Eq. (14) only when px; y  0
or px; y  minfpx; pyg. (It can be shown, using Theorem 3, that
Dempster’s rule defines coherent conditional possibilities in Problem 2 if
and only if, for every x; y in XY, either px; y  0 or px; y 
minfpx; pyg.) Thus Dempster’s rule produces incoherence in Problem 2
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whenever there are x; y in XY such that 0 < px; y < minfpx; pyg. In
that case the values pDExjy and pDEyjx are too small to achieve coherence
with p; .
In the following example, we show that any transformed Dempster’s rule
may produce values p/j that are incoherent in Problem 2 (irrespective of the
choice of /).
Example 4. Let / be an order preserving permutation of 0; 1. Let the two
possibility spaces be X  fa; bg and Y  fc; dg. As in Example 3, define the
joint possibility distribution p;  by pb; d  1
2
and px; y  1 if x; y 6
b; d. For the marginal distributions, we have that pa  pb  pc 
pd  1, so for every x 2 X and y 2 Y: p/xjy  p/yjx  px; y 
pDExjy  pDEyjx. The rule produces the same values for the conditional
possibilities as Dempster’s rule, and will therefore produce incoherent values
of p/xjy and p/yjx for x; y  b; d.
The following result establishes that natural extension produces coherent
conditional possibilities in Problem 2. (In fact the general procedure of natural
extension always preserves coherence, provided only that the underlying pos-
sibility spaces X and Y are finite; see Ref. [24], Section 8.1.) A slight modifi-
cation of the proof shows that regular extension is also coherent.
Theorem 5. Let p;  be a normal possibility distribution on XY, and let
pNEj denote the conditional possibility distributions produced by natural
extension (Section 1.9). Then p; , fpNEjy: y 2 Yg and fpNEjx: x 2 Xg are
coherent.
Theorems 4 and 5 together imply that pNEjy and pNEjx are the largest
(i.e. the least informative) conditional possibility distributions which achieve
coherence in Problem 2. (This is a general property of natural extension; see
Ref. [24].) The following corollary gives another characterisation of pNEjy as
the upper envelope of a set of conditional probability measures.
Corollary 1. With the notation of Theorem 5, let P denote the possibility measure
that is generated by p; . Then, for every y in Y, pNEjy is the upper envelope
of the set of all conditional probability measures P jy that are coherent with
some probability measure P that is dominated by P . Here P jy and P are
coherent if and only if they satisfy Bayes’ rule, i.e. P Bjy  P B fyg=
P X fyg whenever the denominator is non-zero and B  X.
Theorem 5 establishes that there are conditioning rules which are coherent
in Problem 2. However, as discussed in Section 1.9, conditioning by natural
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extension is ‘almost uninformative’ in the sense that pNEjy can be non-vac-
uous for at most one value of y. It is desirable to find a conditioning rule that is
coherent in Problem 2 and typically produces non-vacuous conditional possi-
bility distributions. By Theorem 4, any coherent rule must satisfy: if px; y 
py > 0 then pxjy  1. The strongest non-vacuity property that is compat-
ible with coherence is the condition:
px; y < py ) pxjy < 1: 18
It turns out that the harmonic mean rule, which has this property, is coherent
in Problem 2.
Theorem 6. Let p;  be a normal possibility distribution on XY, and
let pHMj denote the conditional possibility distributions produced by the
harmonic mean rule (defined in Section 1.11). Then p; , fpHMjy: y 2 Yg and
fpHMjx: x 2 Xg are coherent.
In the numerical examples that we have studied, the conditional possibilities
pHMxjy and pHMyjx either achieve equality or nearly do so in at least one of
the inequalities (14)–(16) for most values of x; y. By substituting the formulae
for pHMxjy in Eq. (14), we find that the harmonic mean rule achieves equality
in Eq. (14) whenever any of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) px; y  1;
(ii) px; y  0; (iii) px; y  px > by; (iv) px; y  py > gx;
(v) px  by < 1; (vi) py  gx < 1; or (vii) by  gx  1 and
px  py. When X and Y each contain two elements, for example, there
must be equality in Eq. (14) for at least two of the four x; y pairs, and if
px1; y2  px2; y1 then there must be equality in Eq. (14) for all x; y. For
instance, in the numerical Example 3 that was given to illustrate the incoher-
ence of Dempster’s rule, the harmonic mean rule produces pHMbjd 
pHMdjb  23, which achieves equality in Eqs. (14)–(16). (It is the smallest
value that satisfies these inequalities.) Thus the harmonic mean rule appears to
produce conditional possibilities that are about as small as possible (i.e. as
informative as possible) to achieve coherence.
7. Conclusion
We have investigated the coherence properties of various rules for defining
conditional possibilities. These properties are summarised in Table 1. The
conditional possibility distributions produced by the rules of Zadeh and
Nguyen are usually not normal, and they are not reasonable under the be-
havioural interpretation adopted in this paper. The Dubois–Prade rule,
Ramer’s rule and the renormalised Hisdal rules avoid sure loss, but they are
typically incoherent even in the simpler Problem 1, and they therefore seem
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unsatisfactory under a behavioural interpretation. Dempster’s rule is coherent
in Problem 1 but typically not in Problem 2, when it is used to condition on x
as well as on y.
Of the rules examined in this paper, only three are coherent in both
problems: natural extension, regular extension and the new harmonic mean
rule. Natural extension models the information that is contained in the
unconditional possibility distribution p;  concerning conditional possi-
bilities. That is, the conditional betting rates pNExjy that are produced by
natural extension are the rates that can be constructed, by combining bets,
from the unconditional betting rates alone, without providing any addi-
tional information. If the aim is to model what can be learned about
conditional possibilities from the unconditional possibility distribution
alone, then natural extension is the correct conditioning rule. By Theorem
4, any coherent conditional possibility distribution pjy must provide at
least as much information about conditional betting rates as natural ex-
tension. From this point of view, any other coherent conditioning rule is
implicitly adding information to that contained in the unconditional pos-
sibility distribution.
Unfortunately the natural extension pNEjy may be too uninformative to
be useful, as pNEjy can be non-vacuous for at most one possible value of y.
This simply reflects the fact that the unconditional possibility distribution
p;  alone supplies very little information, and sometimes none at all, about
conditional possibilities. Regular extension is only slightly more informative
than natural extension.
If it is necessary to define non-vacuous conditional possibilities then either
additional information must be supplied or another conditioning rule must be
Table 1
Coherence properties of the conditioning rules surveyed in this paper. All the rules in the table
avoid sure loss in both Problems 1 and 2







Zadeh’s rule no no no
Nguyen’s rule no no no
Ramer’s rule yes no no
Dubois–Prade rule yes no no
Dempster’s rule yes yes no
Transformed Dempster’s rule yes Depends on / no
Renormalised Hisdal rules yes Only Dempster’s rule no
Natural extension yes yes yes
Regular extension yes yes yes
Harmonic mean rule yes yes yes
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used. Of the alternative rules studied in this paper, the new harmonic mean rule
is the most satisfactory. It has the following desirable properties.
(a) It is coherent in both Problems 1 and 2.
(b) It generally produces non-vacuous conditional possibility distributions,
in the sense that pHMxjy < 1 whenever px; y < py.
(c) Conditional possibilities are intermediate between those produced by
natural extension and Dempster’s rule.
(d) The conditional distributions seem to be about as informative as possible
to achieve coherence in Problem 2.
(e) It has the continuity and monotonicity properties noted in Section 1.11.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Results
Let L denote the set of all functions Z:XY! R. Any probability
measure P, defined on the power set of XY, has a unique extension to a
linear prevision (i.e. a positive linear functional with unit norm) on L, defined
by PZ Px2X Py2Y P fx; ygZx; y for all Z 2L.
Lemma 1. Let D be an arbitrary subset of L. Then the following conditions are
equivalent.
(I) There is a probability measure P (defined on the power set of XY) whose
associated linear prevision satisfies P ZP 0 for all Z 2 D.
(II) For any non-negative integer n and Z1, Z2; . . . ; Zn inD, there are x 2 X and
y 2 Y such that Pnj1 Zjx; yP 0.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.3.2 of Ref. [24], using the assumption that
XY is finite. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let D  fkGA: kP 0;A  XYg[ flGBjy : lP 0;
B  X; y 2 Yg. By condition (4), P and f Pjy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss if and
only ifD satisfies condition (II) of Lemma 1. This is equivalent to condition (I) of
Lemma 1, and hence to the existence of a probability measure P which satisfies
i P GA  P A ÿ P AP 0; i:e: PA6 P A;
whenever A  XY; and
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ii P GBjy  P X fyg P Bjy ÿ PB fygP 0;
i:e: if P X fyg > 0 then P B fyg=P X fyg6 PBjy;
for all B  X; y 2 Y:
Thus avoiding sure loss is equivalent to the existence of a P which satisfies (i)
and (ii). It remains to be proven that this is equivalent to the existence of
probability measures which satisfy (a)–(c) of Theorem 1. If probability
measures P and fP jy: y 2 Yg satisfy (a)–(c) then P satisfies (i), which is
identical to (a), and (ii), which follows from (b) and (c). (Condition (ii) holds
when P X fyg  0 since then P GBjy  0.) Conversely, suppose that a
probability measure P satisfies (i) and (ii). Then P satisfies (a) of the Theo-
rem. Define conditional probability measures P jy by P Bjy  PB
fyg=P X fyg whenever P X fyg > 0, so that (c) is satisfied. Then (b)
holds whenever P X fyg > 0, by (ii). Because each P jy is a normal
possibility measure, it is a coherent upper probability measure, and it follows
from Theorem 3.3.3 of Ref. [24] that, for each y 2 Y, there is a probability
measure P jy which satisfies (b). If P X fyg  0 then Pjy can be taken
to be any such probability measure. Thus (a)–(c) are satisfied. This completes
the proof of part 1 of the Theorem. Part 2 can be proven by a similar
argument, taking D  fkGA: kP 0;A  XYg [ flGBjy : l P 0;B  X;
y 2 Yg [ fsGCjx: sP 0; C  Y; x 2 Xg, and using Lemma 1 to show that
avoiding sure loss is equivalent to the existence of a probability measure P
which satisfies (i), (ii) and
iii if P fxg Y > 0 then Pfxg  C=P fxg Y6 PCjx;
for all C  Y; x 2 X:
By the preceding argument, (i) and (ii) are equivalent to (a)–(c), and an anal-
ogous argument shows that (iii) is equivalent to (d) and (e). 
Proof of Theorem 2. First consider Problem 1. Since p;  is normal, there are
x1 2 X and y1 2 Y such that px1; y1  1. To verify Eq. (4), take x  x1 and
y  y1 in Eq. (4). If x1; y1 2 A then P A ÿ IAx1; y1  1ÿ 1  0. If x1 2 B
then P Bjy1 ÿ IBx1  1ÿ 1  0, since P Bjy1P px1jy1  1 by Eq. (6).
Hence the left hand side of Eq. (4) simplifies toX
AXY;x1;y162A
kA P A 
X
BX;x1 62B
lB; y1 P Bjy1;
which is non-negative as required. Thus P and f P jy: y 2 Yg avoid sure loss.
For Problem 2, the analogous condition to Eq. (6) implies that py1jx1  1.
Hence P Cjx1 ÿ ICy1  1ÿ 1  0 when y1 2 C, soX
CY
sC; x1 P Cjx1 ÿ ICy1 
X
CY;y1 62C
sC; x1 P Cjx1P 0:
P. Walley, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 63–107 93
Hence Eq. (5) holds for x  x1 and y  y1. Thus P , f Pjy: y 2 Yg and
f P jx: x 2 Xg avoid sure loss. 
Given normal possibility measures P and f P jy: y 2 Yg, let M1 denote the
set of all probability measures (defined on the power set of XY) which
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in the proof of Theorem 1, i.e.
M1 fP 2 P: P A6 P A when A  XY;
and P B fyg6 P X fygP Bjy when B  X; y 2 Yg;
where P denotes the set of all probability measures whose domain is the power
set of XY. When P is regarded as a simplex in a finite-dimensional Eu-
clidean space, its subset M1, which is the set of solutions for a finite system of
weak linear inequalities, is a closed convex polyhedron. The proof of Theorem
1 shows that the given possibility measures avoid sure loss if and only if M1 is
non-empty. The next two lemmas, which lead to Theorem 3, show that the
given possibility measures are coherent if and only if they are ‘upper envelopes’
of M1, in a sense which is made explicit in Lemma 3.
Similarly, given normal possibility measures P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and
f P jx: x 2 Xg, let M2 denote the set of all probability measures which satisfy
conditions (i)–(iii) in the proof of Theorem 1. Again M2 is a closed convex
polyhedron in P, and the given possibility measures avoid sure loss if and only
if M2 is non-empty.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the possibility measures P and f P jy: y 2 Yg avoid sure
loss, so that M1 is non-empty.
(a) Condition (7) in the definition of coherence holds for a fixed set Ao 
XY if and only if there is a probability measure P 2M1 such that
P Ao  P Ao.
(b) Condition (8) in the definition of coherence holds for a fixed Bo  X and
vo 2 Y if and only if there is a probability measure P 2M1 such that
P Bo  fvog  P X fvog P Bojvo.
Proof. For a, apply Lemma 1 to D  fkGA: kP 0;A  XYg[
flGBjy: l P 0;B  X; y 2 Yg [ fÿGAog. Then condition (II) of Lemma 1 is
equivalent to Eq. (7) for fixed Ao, and (I) of Lemma 1 is equivalent to the existence
of a probability measure P which belongs to M1 and satisfies P GAo  0, i.e.
P Ao  P Ao. For b, apply Lemma 1 to D  fkGA: k P 0;A  XYg
[flGBjy: lP 0;B  X; y 2 Yg [ fÿGBojvog. 
Lemma 3. Under the assumptions of Problems 1 and 2,
1. P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent if and only if there is a non-empty set M of
probability measures (each defined on the power set of XY) such that
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(i) P A  supfP A: P 2Mg whenever A  XY, and
(ii) P BjyP supfP B fyg=P X fyg: P 2M; P X fyg > 0g when-
ever B  X, y 2 Y and P X fyg > 0, with equality whenever by < 1,
where by  P X cofyg. (There can be at most one value
y 2 Y for which by < 1).
If there is such a set M then M1 is the largest such set.
2. P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and f P jx: x 2 Xg are coherent if and only if there is a
non-empty set M of probability measures which satisfies (i), (ii) and
(iii) P CjxP supfP fxg  C=P fxgY: P 2M; P fxg Y > 0gwhen-
ever C  Y, x 2 X and P fxg Y > 0, with equality whenever gx < 1,
where gx  Pcofxg Y.
If there is such a set M then M2 is the largest such set.
Proof. We will prove part 1; the proof of part 2 is completely analogous.
First suppose that a non-empty set M satisfies (i) and (ii). Then every
P 2M must satisfy the inequalities in the definition of M1, so M M1.
Hence PA  supfPA: P 2Mg6 supfP A: P 2M1g6 P A, which shows
that M1 satisfies (i). Similarly M1 satisfies (ii). This proves that there is a set
M which satisfies (i) and (ii) if and only if M1 does so. Since M is non-
empty, so is M1, and the possibility measures avoid sure loss by Theorem 1.
Also P Ao  supfP Ao: P 2M1g for any Ao  XY, since M1 satisfies
(i). Because M1 is a closed subset of P under the natural topology, the
supremum value of PAo is attained on M1. Thus there is a probability
measure P 2M1 such that P Ao  P Ao. By a of Lemma 2, the
coherence condition (7) holds for every Ao  XY. Also, for any Bo  X
and vo 2 Y, there is P 2M1 such that P Bo  fvog  P X fvog P Bojvo;
this follows from (ii) when PX cofvog < 1, since then P Bojvo 
supfPBo  fvog=P X fvog: P 2M1g and the supremum is attained by
some P 2M1, and otherwise there is P 2M1 with P X cofvog  P X
cofvog  1 and hence P X fvog  0  P Bo  fvog. By b of Lemma 2,
the coherence condition (8) holds for every Bo  X and vo 2 Y. This
establishes that P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent.
Conversely, suppose that P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent. Applying
a of Lemma 2, for any A  XY there is P 2M1 such that
P A  P A. But supfP A: P 2M1g6 PA by definition of M1, so there
is equality and M1 satisfies (i). The inequality in (ii) is satisfied by M1,
by definition of M1. To establish the equality (second part) of (ii), sup-
pose that B  X, y 2 Y and PX cofyg < 1. By b of Lemma 2, there
is P 2M1 such that P B fyg  PX fyg P Bjy. Since P 2M1, P X
cofyg6 P X cofyg < 1, so PX fyg  1ÿ P X cofyg > 0. Hence
P B fyg= P X fyg  P Bjy, from which the second part of (ii)
follows. Thus M1 satisfies (i) and (ii). 
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Remark 7. Lemmas 2 and 3 remain valid when P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and
f P jx: x 2 Xg are general upper probability measures, e.g. possibility
measures that are not normal. However, Theorem 3 relies on the assumption
that P jy is a coherent upper probability measure (e.g. a normal possibility
measure) when P X cofyg  1; this assumption is used in the following
proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Again we prove part 1 of the theorem; the proof of
part 2 is analogous. First suppose that there are probability measures which
satisfy (a)–(c) of Theorem 3. Let M  fPc: c 2 Cg, and verify that M
satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3. Clearly (a) implies (i). The first
(inequality) part of (ii) holds because, whenever PcX fyg > 0,
PcB fyg=PcX fyg  PcBjy6 P Bjy, using (c) and (b). Suppose that
P X cofyg < 1. Then, as in the proof of Lemma 3, PcX fyg > 0 for all
c 2 C. Applying (b) and (c), PBjy  supfPcBjy: c 2 Cg  supfPcB fyg
=PcX fyg: c 2 Cg. This establishes the second (equality) part of (ii). Thus
M satisfies (i) and (ii). By Lemma 3, P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent. Thus
(a)–(c) are sucient for coherence.
Conversely, suppose that P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent. By Lemma 3,
the non-empty set M1 satisfies (i) and (ii). Let C index the probability measures
in M1, i.e. M1  fPc: c 2 Cg. (As explained below, a single probability measure
P 2M1 may appear as Pc with many dierent indices c, to cope with the case
where P X fyg  0.) For each c 2 C and y 2 Y, define conditional proba-
bility measures Pcjy as follows. If PcX fyg > 0 then define PcBjy 
PcB fyg=PcX fyg whenever B  X. This ensures that (c) is satisfied.
Now consider the case PcX fyg  0. By assumption, Pjy is a normal
possibility measure and therefore a coherent upper probability measure. It
follows that P jy can be written as the upper envelope of a finite set of
probability measures fP icjy: i  1; 2; . . . ; kg, whose cardinality k is no greater
than the cardinality of X. Define the unconditional probability measure as-
sociated with P icjy to be P ic  Pc for i  1; 2; . . . ; k. (That is, we include k
copies of Pc in the indexed set of measures, each copy being associated with a
dierent conditional probability measure P icjy.)
As noted above, (c) holds by definition of Pcjy. Finally, verify that con-
ditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. By (i), P is the upper envelope of
M1  fPc: c 2 Cg, so (a) holds. If P X cofyg < 1 then PcX fyg > 0 for
every c 2 C, so that PcBjy  PcB fyg=PcX fyg, and (b) follows from
(ii). If P X cofyg  1 then there is Pc 2M1 with PcX fyg  0, by con-
struction Pjy is the upper envelope of fPcjy: PcX fyg  0; c 2 Cg, and
P jy dominates the upper envelope of fPcjy: PcX fyg > 0; c 2 Cg by (c)
and (ii). Hence (b) holds in all cases. Thus (a)–(c) are necessary for
coherence. 
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Lemma 4. Suppose that p is a possibility distribution on a finite set X, and M is a
set of probability measures (each defined on the power set of X) which satisfies,
for all xo 2 X, the two conditions:
(a) P fx 2 X: px6 pxog6 pxo for all P 2M; and
(b) if pxo > 0 then there is P 2M such that P fxog  pxo.
Then the possibility measure P generated by the possibility distribution p is the
upper envelope of M, i.e. P A  maxfpx: x 2 Ag  maxfP A: P 2Mg for
all non-empty A  X.
Proof. Suppose that M satisfies (a) and (b). Given a non-empty set A  X, let
xo maximise px over x 2 A, so that pxo  P A. Then
A  fx 2 X: px6 pxog. Using (a), we find that PA6 Pfx 2 X:
px6 pxog6 pxo  PA for all P 2M. Thus P A6 P A for all P 2M.
If pxo  0 then 0  P AP P AP 0, so PA  0  P A for all P 2M.
If pxo > 0 then, using (b), there is P 2M such that Pfxog  pxo  P A,
hence P AP P fxog  P A. It follows that P A  maxfP A: P 2Mg in
both cases. 
Proof of Theorem 4. First suppose that p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are coherent.
The lower and upper bounds for pxjy can be obtained directly from the two
inequalities in the definition of coherence in Section 4.2. Let uo 2 X and
vo 2 Y. For the lower bound, substitute into Eq. (7) the values Ao  fuo; vog,
kX fvog  puojvo, kA  0 for all other A  XY, lfuog; vo  1 and
lB; v  0 for all other B  X and v 2 Y. Using P X fvog  pvo,
P fuogjvo  puojvo and P fuo; vog  puo; vo and cancelling the terms
involving indicator functions, Eq. (7) implies that puojvopvoP puo; vo.
This gives the lower bound puo; vo=pvo for puojvo, if pvo > 0.
To obtain the upper bound, substitute into Eq. (8) Bo  fuog,
kfuo; vog  1ÿ puojvo, kfuo; vog [X cofvog  puojvo, kA  0 for
all other A  XY, and lB; v  0 for all B  X and v 2 Y. Using
P fuo; vog  puo; vo, P fuo; vog [X cofvog  maxfpuo; vo; bvog
where bvo  P X cofvog  maxfpv: v 2 Y; v 6 vog, and P fuogjvo 
puojvo, and cancelling the two terms involving Ifuo;vog, Eq. (8) implies that
(for some x, y)
1ÿ puojvopuo; vo  puojvomaxfpuo; vo;bvog ÿ IXcofvog
ÿ puojvoIXfvogP 0:
Combining the two indicator functions and rearranging terms,
puo; voP puojvopuo; vo  1ÿmaxfpuo; vo; bvog. If the term in square
brackets is zero then puo; vo  0 and bvo  1, in which case the upper bound
in the theorem is the trivial value 1. Otherwise we can divide both sides by the
term in square brackets to obtain the upper bound for puojvo.
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Conversely, suppose that p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg satisfy the conditions of
Theorem 4. To prove that they are coherent, we will construct a set M of
probability measures which satisfies the two conditions of Lemma 3. For each
y 2 Y, let x  uy maximise px; y, so that puy; y  py. Let y1 2 Y be
such that py1  1, and let y2 2 cofy1g maximise py over all y 2 cofy1g.
Suppose that px; y > 0. Then py > 0, and pxjy > 0 by the lower bound
in Theorem 4. Define a probability measure Px;y to have the following proba-
bility mass function: Px;yx; y  px; y, Px;yuy; y  px; y1ÿ pxjy=pxjy
if x 6 uy, Px;yuy1; y1  1ÿ px; y=pxjy if y 6 y1, Px;yuy2; y2  1
ÿpx; y1=pxjy1 if y  y1; and Px;yu; v  0 for all other u; v 2 XY. Then
Px;yu; v > 0 for at most three pairs u; v, i.e. for u; v  x; y, uy; y and
either uy1; y1 or uy2; y2. It can be easily verified that these probabilities
are non-negative, using the lower bound in the theorem to show that
px; y6 pxjy, and that they sum to one, using the lower bound again to show
that puyjy  1. Thus each Px;y is a probability measure. Define
M  fPx;y : x; y 2 XY; px; y > 0g.
Next verify that M satisfies condition (i) of Lemma 3, i.e. that M has upper
envelope P where P A  maxfpu; v: u; v 2 Ag for A  XY. By Lemma
4, it suces to prove that
(a) Px;yfu; v 2 XY: pu; v6 pw; zg6 pw; z whenever w; z 2 XY
and Px;y 2M; and
(b) if x; y 2 XY and px; y > 0 then there is P 2M such that
P x; y  px; y.
Clearly (b) is satisfied, since Px;yx; y  px; y whenever x; y 2 XY and
px; y > 0, by definition of Px;y .
Consider (a). Suppose that x; y 2 XY and px; y > 0. It suces to
verify (a) for those w; z which have positive probability under Px;y , and
therefore we need only to consider w; z 2 fx; y; uy; y; uy1; y1;
uy2; y2g. Clearly (a) holds when w; z  uy1; y1, since puy1; y1  1.
When y 6 y1, we need to consider only w; z  x; y and w; z  uy; y: (a)
holds in the first case because Px;yx; y  px; y, and also in the second case
because, using the lower bound in the theorem, Px;yfx; y; uy; yg
 px; y=pxjy6py  puy; y.
Suppose that y  y1. We need to consider only w; z  x; y1 and
w; z  uy2; y2. Using the upper bound for pxjy1 in the theorem,
px; y1=pxjy1P px; y1  1ÿmaxfpx; y1; by1g, where by1  py2 
puy2; y2 since y2 maximises py over y 6 y1. (This holds when by1  1
as then pxjy16 1.) Consequently, Px;yfx; y1; uy2; y2g  px; y1
1ÿ px; y1=pxjy16 maxfpx; y1; puy2; y2g. Using maxfpx; y1; by1g6
px; y1 by1  px; y1  py2, the first inequality gives px; y1=pxjy1P
1ÿ py2, from which it follows that Px;yuy2; y2  1ÿ px; y1=pxjy16
py2. Finally, Px;yx; y  px; y. This establishes (a). Thus M satisfies (i) of
Lemma 3.
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Next verify (ii) of Lemma 3. Suppose that px; y > 0 and v 2 Y. If
Px;yX fvg > 0, define a conditional probability measure Px;yjv by
Px;yBjv  Px;yB fvg=Px;yX fvg for all B  X. We need to prove that
Px;yBjv6 P Bjv whenever the left-hand side is defined.
First consider the case v  y. Then Px;yjy is defined since
Px;yX fygP px; y > 0. To verify that Px;yBjy6 P Bjy, we need only to
consider sets B that contain x or uy, since Px;yu; y  0 for all other values of
u. The inequality holds when uy 2 B because, using the lower bound in the
theorem, P BjyP puyjyP puy; y=py  1. It holds also when B con-
tains x but not uy, because then Px;yBjy  Px;yfxgjy  Px;yx; y=Px;yx; y 
Px;yuy; y  pxjy  Pfxgjy6 P Bjy (using the definition of Px;y). (This
holds when x  uy, using the lower bound in the theorem, as then all terms
are 1.) Thus the inequality holds for v  y.
The remaining cases for which Px;yjv may be defined are the case v 
y1 6 y and v  y2 6 y. The inequality holds trivially in these cases because,
using the lower bound in the theorem, P Bjyi  puyijyi  1 if uyi 2 B, and
otherwise Px;yBjyi  0. This establishes that Px;yBjv6 P Bjv whenever the
left-hand side is defined, whence PBjvP supfPx;yBjv: Px;y 2M; Px;yX
fvg > 0g whenever B  X, v 2 Y and P X fvg > 0. To complete the proof
of (ii), we need to show that there is equality whenever bv < 1, where
bv  P X cofvg.
Suppose that bv < 1. (That can happen only when v  y1.) Given
B  X, let u  x maximise pujv over u 2 B, so that P Bjv 
maxfpujv: u 2 Bg  pxjv. Now P jv is defined for all P 2M since
P X fvgP 1ÿ bv > 0. To establish the required equality, it suces to
prove that PfxgjvP pxjv for some P 2M, because then
P BjvP P fxgjvP pxjv  P Bjv. This holds trivially when px; v  0,
since then pxjv  0 by the upper bound in the theorem, using bv < 1.
It holds also when px; v > 0, because then Px;v is defined and
Px;vfxgjv  pxjv. This completes the proof of (ii).
By Lemma 3, P and f P jy: y 2 Yg are coherent, i.e. the corresponding
possibility distributions p;  and fpjy: y 2 Yg are coherent. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let P be the upper probability measure that is generated
by p; , and let M denote the set of all probability measures that are
dominated by P , i.e.
M  fP 2 P: PA6 PA for all A  XYg:
Verify that M satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3. Condition (i) holds because
P is a coherent upper probability measure, which implies that P is the upper
envelope of M by Theorem 3.3.3 of Ref. [24]. Condition (ii) holds trivially
P. Walley, G. de Cooman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 21 (1999) 63–107 99
whenever by  1, since then pNEjy is vacuous and P Bjy 
maxfpNExjy: x 2 Bg  1 whenever B is non-empty.
Suppose that by < 1. Then, for every P 2M, P X fyg > 0 and P jy is
defined by Bayes’ rule. To establish (ii) of Lemma 3 we need to prove that, for
every non-empty B  X,
(a) P Bjy6 P Bjy whenever P 2M, and
(b) for some P 2M, P Bjy  P Bjy.
Let u  x maximise pu; y over u 2 B, so that P B fyg  px; y and
moreover PBjy  maxfpNEujy: u 2 Bg  pNExjy, using the fact that
pNEujy is non-decreasing in pu; y. To prove (a), suppose that P 2M. Then
P B fyg6 P B fyg  px; y, and P coB fyg  1ÿ P B fyg [X
cofygP 1ÿ P Bfyg [X cofyg  1ÿmaxf P B fyg; P X  cofygg
 1ÿmaxfpx; y; byg. Hence P Bjy  P Bfyg=P B fyg  P coB
fyg6 px; y=px; y  1ÿmaxfpx; y; byg  pNExjy  P Bjy.
To prove (b), let y2 2 Y satisfy py2  by and y2 6 y, and let uv 2 X
satisfy puv; v  pv. Define a probability measure P to have probability
mass function P x; y  px; y, Puy; y  1ÿmaxfpx; y; byg, P uy2; y2
 maxf0; by ÿ px; yg, and Pw; z  0 for all other w; z 2 XY. (This
agrees with the probability measure Px;y defined in the proof of Theorem 4,
provided that px; y > 0.) Then clearly P BjyP P fxgjy  px; y=px; y 
1ÿmaxfpx; y; byg  pNExjy  P Bjy.
It remains to be shown that P 2M, i.e. that PA6 P A for all A  XY,
and it suces to verify this inequality when A is a subset of
fx; y; uy; y; uy2; y2g because only these elements can have positive
probability under P . The inequality holds when uy; y 2 A because then PA
P puy; y  py  1, since by < 1. It holds for A  fx; yg since
P x; ypx; y, and for A  fuy2; y2g since P uy2; y26 by  puy2; y2.
Finally, the inequality holds when A  fx; y; uy2; y2g because then
P A  maxfpx; y; byg  PA. This completes the verification of (ii) in
Lemma 3.
Condition (iii) of Lemma 3 holds similarly, since both pNEj and M are
defined symmetrically in x and y (unlike the M used in the proof of Theorem
4). It follows from part 2 of Lemma 3 that P , f P jy: y 2 Yg and f P jx:
x 2 Xg are coherent, i.e. the corresponding possibility distributions
p; , fpNEjy: y 2 Yg and fpNEjx: x 2 Xg are coherent. 
Remark 8. As in Theorem 4, if py  0 or px  0 then pjy or pjx can be
taken to be any possibility distribution without aecting coherence. A slight
modification of the preceding proof establishes that coherence holds also for
regular extension in Problem 2. The only part of the proof that needs to be
modified is the verification of P Bjy6 PBjy when by  1, P Bjy  0 and
P X fyg > 0. Then pRExjy  0 for all x 2 B. This implies that
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0  px; yP P x; y for all x 2 B, and hence that P B fyg  0 and
P Bjy  0, which establishes the required inequality.
Proof of Corollary 1. From the proof of Theorem 5 we deduce that, when
by < 1, P Bjy  maxfP Bjy: P 2Mg, where P Bjy  P B fyg=P X
fyg and M is the set of all probability measures that are dominated by P . The
result therefore holds when by < 1.
Suppose that by  1. Then there are u; v 2 XY such that v 6 y and
pu; v  1. Consider the degenerate probability measure P such that
P u; v  1. Clearly P belongs to M. But P X fyg  0, so P is coherent with
any conditional probability measure P jy. The upper envelope of the set of all
conditional probability measures is the vacuous upper probability P Bjy  1
for all non-empty B  X, which corresponds to the vacuous conditional pos-
sibility distribution pNExjy  1 for all x 2 X. 
Proof of Theorem 6. Let P be the possibility measure generated by p; . By the
second part of Lemma 3, it suces to construct a set of probability measures,
M, which has upper envelope P and also satisfies conditions (ii) and (iii) of
Lemma 3, which relate M to the conditional possibility measures generated by
pHMj. There are four steps in the proof:
(a) Given x; y 2 XY such that px; y > 0, construct a probability
measure Px;y with Px;yx; y  px; y. We then define M  fPx;y : x 2 X;
y 2 Y; px; y > 0g.
(b) Verify that each Px;y is dominated by the possibility measure P . By Lem-
ma 4, it is enough to show that Px;yfu; v: pu; v6pw; zg6 pw; z when-
ever w; z 2 XY. It then follows from Lemma 4 that P is the upper
envelope of M, i.e. condition (i) of Lemma 3 holds.
(c) Verify that Px;yBjv6 P Bjv  maxfpHMujv: u 2 Bg whenever B  X,
v 2 Y, Px;yX fvg > 0 and the conditional probabilities are defined by
Bayes’ rule. Applying Lemma 4(a) to the conditional probability measure
Px;yjv and the conditional possibility distribution pHMjv, it is enough
to show that Px;yfu: u 2 X; pHMujv6 pHMwjvgjv6 pHMwjv whenever
Px;yX fvg > 0 and w 2 X. Similarly verify that Px;yCju6 P Cju when-
ever C  Y, u 2 X and Px;yfug Y > 0.
(d) Show that Px;yxjy  pHMxjy whenever pHMxjy > 0 and by < 1
(which imply px; y > 0), and similarly Px;yyjx  pHMyjx whenever
pHMyjx > 0 and gx < 1. (In fact we can define Px;y so that Px;yxjy 
pHMxjy and Px;yyjx  pHMyjx whenever px; y > 0.) Using Lemma 4,
it follows from (c) and (d) that conditions (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 3 hold.
It then follows from Lemma 3 that P , f Pjy: y 2 Yg and f P jx: x 2 Xg are
coherent, i.e. the corresponding possibility distributions p; , fpHMjy:
y 2 Yg and fpHMjx: x 2 Xg are coherent.
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We assume throughout that x 2 X, y 2 Y and px; y > 0. The first step is to
construct Px;y to satisfy Px;yx; y  px; y. In the proof of Theorem 4, that was
done simply by assigning positive probability to u2; y where u  u2 maximises
pu; y, and assigning all the remaining probability to a single element of
XY. The positive probability of u2; y will often produce P yju2  1. That
caused no diculty in the proof of Theorem 4 because in Problem 1 we were
not concerned with pyjx. However Problem 2 is more complicated, and in
particular we need to ensure that Px;yyju26pHMyju2. To do so, we may need
to assign positive probability to u2; v3 where v  v3 maximises pu2; v. But
then, to ensure that Px;yu2jv36 pHMu2jv3, we may need to assign positive
probability to some u4; v3, and so on, producing a sequence of terms x; y,
u2; y, u2; v3, u4; v3, u4; v5, . . . with positive probability. Similarly, to en-
sure that Px;yyjx6pHMyjx, we typically need to assign positive probability to
x; v2 for some v2 6 y, and hence to all terms in a second sequence x; y,
x; v2, u3; v2, u3; v4, . . .
Formally, write uo  u1  x and vo  v1  y, let ui maximise pu; viÿ1 for
i  2; 3; . . . and let vj maximise pujÿ1; v for j  2; 3; . . ., where each sequence
terminates when no further increase in pu; v is possible. (If there are several
maximising values of u or v, choose the one which appears first in a fixed or-
dering of X or Y.) Both sequences must terminate because XY is finite and
pu; v is strictly increasing along each sequence. Denoting the termination
points (which may or may not be dierent) by s1; t1 and s2; t2,
px; y  puo; v1 < pv1  pu2; v1 < pu2  pu2; v3 < pv3
 pu4; v3 <    < ps1  pt1  ps1; t1
and
px; y  pu1; vo < pu1  pu1; v2 < pv2  pu3; v2 < pu3
 pu3; v4 <    < ps2  pt2  ps2; t2:
The probability measure Px;y is defined to give the following probability
masses to the terms in the two sequences:
Px;yx; y  px; y;
Px;yui; vi1  12pui; vi1 ÿ pui; viÿ1;
Px;yui1; vi  12pui1; vi ÿ puiÿ1; vi
for i  1; 2; . . .
Although the terms in one sequence must be distinct, since pu; v is strictly
increasing, one term u; v 6 x; y may appear in both sequences. If so, take its
probability to be the sum of the two probabilities defined in the previous pa-
ragraph. Then the total probability assigned to the two sequences is px; y 
1
2
pu2; v1 ÿ px; y  pu2; v3 ÿ pu2; v1     ps1; t1  pu1; v2 ÿ px; y 
pu3; v2 ÿ pu1; v2      ps2; t2  12 ps1; t1  ps2; t26 1. (The factor 12
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enables us to handle both sequences simultaneously.) Any remaining prob-
ability 1ÿ 1
2
ps1; t1  ps2; t2 needs to be assigned to other elements of
XY.
There are five cases to consider, depending on the values of px; y, px,
py, gx and by. In each case we complete the definition of Px;y and outline
the four steps of the proof, omitting some details.
Case (i): px < 1 and py < 1. (This implies that px; y < by  gx  1.)
(a) Since in this case px  maxfpx; v: v 2 Yg < 1, py 
maxfpu; y: u 2 Xg < 1 and in general maxfpu; v: u; v 2 XYg  1,
there is q; r 2 XY such that q 6 x, r 6 y and pq; r  1. Assign all
the remaining probability 1ÿ 1
2
ps1; t1  ps2; t2 to q; r, and let
Px;yu; v  0 if u; v is not in either sequence and u; v 6 q; r. (If possible,
take q; r to be the termination point of either sequence.)
(b) Let w; z 2 XY and Aw; z  fu; v: pu; v6 pw; zg. We need to
show that Px;yAw; z6pw; z. This obviously holds if pw; z  1. If
pu; v6 px; y and u; v 6 x; y then Px;yu; v  0 because u; v cannot be-
long to either sequence. Hence, if pw; z6 px; y and w; z 6 x; y
then Px;yAw; z  06 pw; z. If w; z  x; y then Px;yAw; z  pw; z.
Finally, if px; y6 pw; z < 1 then Px;yAw; z  px; y 
P
Px;yu; v,
where the summation is over all terms u; v in the two sequences for which
px; y < pu; v6 pz;w. Let w1; z1 and w2; z2 denote the last terms in
each sequence for which pwi; zi6 pw; z. Then Px;yAw; z  px; y
1
2
pw1; z1ÿpx; y12 pw2; z2ÿpx; y  12 pw1; z1  pw2; z2 6pw; z.
(c) Consider conditioning on v 2 Y such that Px;yX fvg > 0. (Condition-
ing on u 2 X is analogous because case (i) is symmetric between X and Y.)
We need to verify that, if we define the conditional probabilities by Bayes’
rule, then Px;yBjv6 PBjv whenever B  X. From the construction of
Px;y , there are at most three elements u in X such that Px;yu; v > 0, and
one of these (denoted by w) must achieve pw; v  pv. The result is trivial
when w 2 B, since then PBjv  pHMwjv  1.
Hence we need to verify the result only when B contains one or two elements
u such that pu; v < pw; v  pv and Px;yu; v > 0. In that case u; v must
appear in one of the sequences and must be followed by w; v, so that
Px;yw; vP 12 pw; v ÿ pu; v  12 pv ÿ pu; v. If u; v 6 x; y then
Px;yu; v6 12 pu; v, hence (using Bayes’ rule) Px;yujv  Px;yu; v=Px;yv
6 Px;yu; v=Px;yu; v  Px;yw; v 6 pu; v=pu; v  pv ÿ pu; v 
pu; v=pv6 pHMujv  P fugjv. If u; v  x; y then Px;yx; y  px; y,
hence Px;yxjyPx;yx; y=Px;yy6 Px;yx; y=Px;yx; yPx;yw; y6 2p x; y=
py  px; y  pHMxjy  P fxgjy, using the fact that by  1. This es-
tablishes the result when B contains only one element.
Finally consider B  fu; u0g, where both u; v and u0; v have positive prob-
ability under Px;y , pu; v < pw; v  pv and similarly for u0. Then u; v
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and u0; v must appear in dierent sequences, and each must be followed by
w; v. Hence Px;yw; vP 12 pw; v ÿ pu; v  12 pw; v ÿ pu0; v  pv ÿ
1
2
pu; v pu0; v. Also Px;yfu; v; u0; vg6 12 pu; v  pu0; v; this is
true when u0; v  x; y because then Px;yu; v6 12 pu; v ÿ px; y. As a re-
sult, we have that Px;yfu; u0gjv  Px;yfu; v; u0; vg =Px;yfu; v; u0; v;
w; vg6 1
2
pu; v  pu0; v=pv6 maxfpu; v=pv; pu0; v= pvg6
maxfpHMujv; pHMu0jvg  P fu; u0gjv.
(d) This holds trivially in case (i) because by  gx  1. However, the def-
inition of Px;y in case (i) can easily be modified to ensure that Px;yxjy 
pHMxjy and Px;yyjx  pHMyjx, as follows. If px; y  py then
Px;yxjy  1  pHMxjy. Otherwise, x; y is followed in the first sequence
by w; y where pw; y  py > px; y. Provided that w; y does not
occur also in the second sequence, Px;yw; y  12 py ÿ px; y, which
gives Px;yxjy  Px;yx; y=Px;yx; y  Px;yw; y  2px; y=py  px; y 
pHM xjy. If w; y does occur in the second sequence then it is necessary to
reduce the value of Px;yw; y by 12 py ÿ pu; v, where u; v is the last term
in the second sequence which precedes w; y and has v 6 y, to ensure that
Px;yX fyg  12 py  px; y. (The probability that is subtracted can be
added to Px;yq; r.) Similarly, if px; z  px > px; y and x; z occurs in
the first sequence, then reduce Px;yx; z so that Px;yfxg Y 
1
2
px  px; y. Property (b) still holds when Px;y is modified in this way,
because reducing Px;yw; y or Px;yx; z cannot increase Px;yAu; v when
pu; v < 1, and it can be verified that property (c) is satisfied.
Case (ii): py  1 and px; y < by.
(a) In this case the definition of Px;y is more complicated. Note first that
gx  1, because px; y < py  1. Define probabilities Px;y on the two
sequences as before. Here the first sequence must terminate at u2; y since
pu2; y  py  1. Let s; t be the last term in the second sequence such
that t 6 y, or take s; t  x; y if there is no such term (i.e. if
px; y  px). (There may be other terms s; y and u2; y which follow
s; t in the second sequence and have positive probability.) Let q; r achieve
by, i.e. pq; r  by  pr and r 6 y. Assign additional probability
1
2
by ÿ ps; t to q; r; this is non-zero only if q; r 6 s; t. If pq; r <
pq; y and q 6 u2 then assign additional probability 12 pq; y ÿ by toq; y. (In this case q 6 x.) Finally, modify Px;yu2; y so that the total prob-
ability under Px;y is 1.
The total probability assigned to the second sequence up to and including
s; t is 1
2
ps; t  px; y, and therefore Px;yu2; y  1ÿ 12 ps; t  px; y ÿ
Px;ys; y ÿ Px;yq; r ÿ Px;yq; y  1ÿ 12 ps; t  px; y ÿmaxf0; 12 ps; y ÿ
ps; tg ÿ 1
2
by ÿ ps; t ÿmaxf0; 1
2
pq; y ÿ byg  1ÿ 1
2
px; y 
maxf0; ps; y ÿ ps; tg  maxfby; pq; ygP 0, since px; y maxf0;
ps; y ÿ ps; tg6 maxfps; t; ps; yg6 1 (using px; y6 ps; t) and
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maxfby; pq; yg6 1. Here Px;yX fyg  1ÿ 12 ps; t ÿ px; yÿ
1
2
by ÿ ps; t  1ÿ 1
2
by ÿ px; y and Px;yfxg Y  px; y  12 pxÿpx; y  1
2
px  px; y.
(b) We need to show that Px;yAw; z6pw; z, where Aw; z 
fu; v: pu; v6 pw; zg. As in case (i), this holds when w; z belongs to
the second sequence, up to and including s; t. The only other cases that
need to be verified are those with w; z  q; r, q; y or s; y, and the
verification is straightforward because the probability of each term
contains a factor of 1
2
. For example, if pq; r < pq; y < ps; y < 1
then Px;yAq; r  12 by  px; y 6 by  pq; r, Px;yAq; y 
1
2
pq; y px; y6 pq; y, and Px;yAs; y  12 pq; y  px; y  ps; y ÿ
ps; t6 1
2
pq; y  ps; y6ps; y.
(c) First consider conditioning on v 2 Y. When v 6 y, the required inequal-
ity holds as in case (i). Suppose then that v  y. There can be up to four val-
ues of u for which Px;yu; y > 0: u  x, q, s or u2. Assume that all four values
are distinct. (The following argument can be modified to cover the other
possible cases.) Then their probabilities are determined by Px;yx; y 
px; y; Px;yq; y  maxf0; 12 pq; y ÿ byg; Px;ys; y  maxf0; 12 ps; yÿps; tg, and Px;yX fyg  1ÿ 12 by ÿ px; y. Let D  px; y  2ÿby. Using Bayes’ rule, Px;yxjy  2px; y=D, Px;yqjy  maxf0; pq; y ÿ
by=Dg and Px;ysjy  maxf0; ps; y ÿ ps; t=Dg. Also pHMqjy 
pq; y when pq; yP by, pHMsjy  2ps; y=ps; y  2ÿmaxfps; y;
byg, pHMqjyP pHMxjy and pHMsjyP pHMxjy, since pq; y
P px; y and ps; yP px; y. From these expressions it is straightforward
to verify that Px;yBjy6 maxfpHMujy: u 2 Bg  PBjy when B is any sub-
set of fx; q; sg. This inequality holds trivially when u2 2 B since then
P Bjy  pHMu2jy  1.
Next consider conditioning on u 2 X. By essentially the same argument as in
case (i)(c), the required inequality holds for u  q and for all u which appear
in the second sequence, except possibly for u  x and u  u2. Suppose that
u  x. Then Px;yx; v > 0 only when v  y or v  v2, where px; v2  px.
Also Px;yx; y  px; y and Px;yfxg Y  12 px  px; y. By Bayes’ rule,
Px;yyjxPx;yx; y=Px;yfxgY2px; y=px  px; y  pHMyjx, using
the fact that gx  1 in case (ii). Also Px;yv2jx6 1  pHMv2jx since
px; v2  px. Thus (c) is verified for u  x.
Finally, suppose that u  u2. Now Px;yu2; v > 0 only when v  y or v  r (if
q  u2) or v  t (if s  u2). It is straightforward to verify that Px;yrju26by 
pu2; r6pHMrju2when q  u2; Px;ytju26 pu2; t 6 pHMtju2when s  u2;
and Px;yfr; tgju26 by6 pHMrju26 maxfpHMrju2; pHMtju2g P fr; tg
ju2 when q  s  u2. This establishes (c).
(d) As shown in (c), using py  gx  1, Px;yxjy  2px; y=px; y  2ÿ
by  pHMxjy and Px;yyjx  2px; y=px  px; y  pHMyjx, as re-
quired.
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Case (iii): px  1 and px; y < gx.
This is analogous to case (ii), with x and y interchanged.
Case (iv): px; yP by.
(a) Note first that py  1, because pyP px; yP by and
maxfpy; byg  1, and px; y  px, because px; yP byP px; v
when v 6 y. It follows that the two sequences defined earlier are very simple:
the first sequence terminates at u2; y, where pu2; y  py  1, and the
second sequence terminates at x; y. The probability measure Px;y is defined
by Px;yx; y  px; y, Px;yu2; y  1ÿ px; y if u2 6 x, and Px;yu; v  0 for
all other u; v 2 XY.
(b) This holds because Px;yAw; z  0 if pw; z < px; y, Px;yAw; z 
px; y if px; y6 pw; z < 1, and pw; z  1 otherwise, and in each case
Px;yAw; z6pw; z.
(c) This needs to be verified only for v  y, u  x and u  u2, as only these
values have positive probability under Px;y . Here pHMyjx  pHMyju2
 pHMu2jy  1, since px; y  px and pu2; y  pu2  py  1. Also
Px;yxjy  px; y  pHMxjy. Hence the required inequality holds in each
case.
(d) Px;yyjx  1  pHMyjx, and Px;yxjy  px; y  pHMxjy, as required.
Case (v): px; yP gx.
This case is analogous to case (iv).
Note that cases (i)–(v) do cover all possibilities. If neither (ii) nor (iv) holds
then py < 1, and if neither (iii) nor (v) holds then px < 1. Hence, if none of
(ii)–(v) holds then px < 1 and py < 1, so that (i) holds. 
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